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93 
Article 
The Trouble with Counting: Cutting 
Through the Rhetoric of Red Tape Cutting 
Jodi L. Short† 
“You know that I am called the Count 
Because I really love to count 
I could sit and count all day 
Sometimes I get carried away 
I count slowly, slowly, slowly getting faster 
Once I’ve started counting it’s really hard to stop 
Faster, faster. It is so exciting! 
I could count forever, count until I drop.” 
– Sesame Street - The Count’s Counting Song Lyrics | Metro 
Lyrics 
  INTRODUCTION   
On January 30, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Ex-
ecutive Order (EO) 13,771, “Reducing Regulation and Control-
ling Regulatory Costs.” To promote deregulatory goals, EO 
13,771 requires administrative agencies to repeal two regula-
tions for every one they propose or issue, leading many to refer 
to it as the “2-for-1”1 Order. The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) has published detailed guidance instructing 
agencies how to implement this Executive Order, which con-
strains their ability to promulgate new regulations under their 
 
†  Professor of Law, Honorable Roger J. Traynor Chair, UC Hastings Col-
lege of the Law. For insightful comments and discussions, I am grateful to Scott 
Dodson, Jared Ellias, Dan Farber, Erik Gerding, Sarah Light, Dave Owen, Zach 
Price, Dorit Reiss, Reuel Schiller, David Zaring, and participants in the Dereg-
ulatory Frontiers Conference at UC Hastings College of the Law. I am deeply 
indebted to Tiffanie Ellis for her heroic research assistance. Copyright © 2018 
by Jodi L. Short. 
 1. This Article will use either 2-for-1, the Order, or EO 13,771 to refer to 
Executive Order 13,771 that President Trump signed on January 30, 2017 re-
quiring regulation counting. 
  
94 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:93 
 
statutory mandates.2 While many commentators have derided 
EO 13,771 as silly and irrational,3 it would be a mistake to dis-
miss 2-for-1 as a one-off political stunt. In fact, the idea motivat-
ing the Order emerges from a larger intellectual project arguing 
that economic growth is being hampered by the “sheer quantity 
of regulation[s].”4 In a string of studies,5 researchers have at-
tempted to establish this relationship by counting regulations 
 
 2. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB 
MEMO. NO. M-17-21, GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13,771, TI-
TLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY COSTS” (2017) 
[hereinafter OMB GUIDANCE] (explaining policy regarding repealing two exist-
ing regulations whenever an agency promulgates one new regulation). 
 3. See, e.g., Caroline Cecot & Michael Livermore, The One-In, Two-Out 
Executive Order Is a Zero, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 11 (2017) (questioning 
the rationality of the Order’s methodology for deregulating in light of the OMB’s 
stringent counting requirements, which could slow deregulatory initiatives, and 
the fact that “[i]f agencies issue no regulations, then the Order’s requirements 
to repeal at least two existing regulations would not get triggered at all”); Susan 
Dudley, Putting a Cap on Regulation, 42 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4, 5 (2017) 
[hereinafter Capping Regulation] (suggesting that it would be irrational not to 
consider net benefits to “distinguish a good rule from a bad rule”); Nicholas Ash-
ford, Trump Rejects Science, Technology, Economics, and the Constitution With 
His Two-for-One Executive Order, HUFFPOST: BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017, 12:35 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nicholas-ashford/trump-rejects-science-tec_b_ 
14552756.html (describing “the folly of abandoning regulation as a means of 
stimulating technology and employment”); Michael C. Dorf, Trump’s Cut-Regu-
lations Order Is Plain Stupid, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www 
.newsweek.com/michael-dorf-trumps-cut-regulations-order-plain-stupid 
-551293 (pointing out the illogical elements and the means of evading the Or-
der); Dan Farber, Trump’s 2-for-1 Order: Legal Issues, LEGALPLANET (Feb. 6, 
2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/02/06/trumps-2-for-1-order-legal-issues (ex-
plaining five different administrative law issues arising under the Order); Dan 
Farber, Trump’s Anti-Regulation Executive Order, LEGALPLANET (Jan. 30, 
2017), http://legal-planet.org/2017/01/30/trumps-anti-regulation-executive 
-order (“What it will do is cause chaos and uncertainty.”); Sally Katzen, Cutting 
Federal Regulations? Let’s Be Smart About It, THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Dec. 
12, 2016, 12:55 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/ 
309941-cutting-federal-regulations-lets-be-smart-about-it (pointing out that a 
two-for-one requirement could affect uncontroversial regulations that “enable 
the government to function and Americans to go about their lives”). 
 4. See Omar Al-Ubaydli & Patrick A. McLaughlin, RegData: A Numerical 
Database on Industry-Specific Regulations for All United States Industries and 
Federal Regulations, 1997–2012, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 109, 110 (2017) [here-
inafter RegData]; see also infra note 7. 
 5. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND 
COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 
(2017), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Thousand%20Commandments 
%202017.pdf [hereinafter TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS] (providing an over-
view of President Trump’s executive actions and arguing for the need for a 
transparent regulatory state); RegData, supra note 4, at 109–10; Brent Coffey, 
Patrick A. McLaughlin & Robert D. Tollison, Regulators and Redskins, 153 PUB. 
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and correlating these counts to various macroeconomic outcomes 
of interest, like U.S. employment, productivity, and competitive-
ness. 
This intellectual project appears to have two principal aims. 
The first is political. Regulation counting studies radically sim-
plify complex regulatory phenomena to make criticisms of regu-
lation salient to lawmakers and the general public and to bolster 
political support for deregulatory policies. The second is empiri-
cal and, ultimately, legal. By producing scholarly literature doc-
umenting a correlation between the number of regulations and 
negative economic outcomes, anti-regulatory scholars and advo-
cates generate a body of empirical research that agencies and 
courts can rely on in implementing and upholding the legality of 
deregulatory counting policies like 2-for-1.6 
The roll-out and marketing of EO 13,771 plainly demon-
strate the political value of counting studies. President Trump 
and his supporters have repeatedly blamed the number of fed-
eral regulations for negative economic outcomes and claimed 
that they must reduce the number of regulations to spur benefi-
cial economic outcomes. On the campaign trail, President Trump 
 
CHOICE 191, 202 (2012) [hereinafter Regulators and Redskins]; John W. Daw-
son & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic Growth, 18 
J. ECON. GROWTH 137, 137 (2013) (describing the relationship between regula-
tion and macroeconomic indicators and variables); Peter L. Strauss, Publication 
Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential 
Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001). See generally Casey B. Mulligan & 
Andrei Shleifer, The Extent of the Market and the Supply of Regulation, 120 Q.J. 
ECON. 1445 (2005) (providing analysis regarding the extent and limit of regula-
tion through a fixed-cost theory of regulation); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mo-
zart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Adminis-
trative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003) (detailing a systems-based model to 
understand regulatory burdens). 
 6. A pending lawsuit challenges EO 13,771 directly as an unconstitutional 
exercise of executive power because it “revise[s] statutes to condition issuance 
of new regulations on repeal of two or more existing regulations that offset the 
new costs” and also challenges the OMB Guidance Memorandum implementing 
EO 13,771 as arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 38, Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. 
Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-253). The court ruled that the 
plaintiffs lacked both organizational and individual standing to pursue these 
claims, though final judgment has not yet been entered as of the date of this 
publication. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6, 40 (D.D.C. 2018). 
Future challenges to EO 13,771 are likely to arise in challenges to agency deci-
sions to rescind particular regulations that are not justified by traditional reg-
ulatory analysis and that seem to be motivated primarily to the requirement to 
rescind two regulations before promulgating another one. Challenges are also 
likely to arise to agency decisions to delay rulemaking or deny rulemaking pe-
titions based on their need to first repeal two other regulations. 
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promised to “remove bureaucrats who only know how to kill 
jobs.”7 Upon signing EO 13,771, he said that the purpose of the 
Order was to eliminate “the repetitive, horrible regulations that 
hurt companies, hurt jobs.”8 At a briefing on the implementation 
of EO 13,771, President Trump stood between two piles of pa-
per—one more than six feet tall and comprised of multiple 
stacks, the other, a single stack about six inches high.9 “This is 
today,” the President said, gesturing toward the larger pile, tow-
ering over him.10 “This is 1960,” he said, indicating the small 
stack of paper.11 He then cut a piece of ceremonial red tape con-
necting the two piles, and went on to discuss how his administra-
tion’s regulation-cutting project had already resulted in in-
creased wages, lower unemployment, rising economic growth, 
and “the stock market . . . soaring to new record levels.”12 These 
claims have been echoed by supportive interest groups. The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, for instance, has been vocal in its sup-
port of 2-for-1 on the grounds that it will “drive growth and 
jobs.”13 The Competitive Enterprise Institute has argued in sup-
port of the Order as well, stating that the removal of regulations 
“would provide genuine economic stimulus.”14 
 
 7. Tamara Keith et al., Fact Check: Donald Trump Unveils His Economic 
Plan in Major Detroit Speech, NPR ONLINE (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.npr.org/ 
2016/08/08/488816816/donald-trump-looks-to-turn-the-page-on-bad-week-with 
-economic-speech; see also Office of Budget & Spending, Remarks by President 
Trump on Deregulation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-deregulation 
(commenting that regulations have cost the “country trillions and trillions of 
dollars, millions of jobs, countless American factories, and devastated many in-
dustries”). 
 8. UPI, Trump Signs Executive Order on Regulatory Reform, BREITBART 
(Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/news/trump-signs-executive-order-on 
-regulatory-reform. 
 9. CNBC, President Donald Trump: Regulation Is a Stealth Taxation, Let’s 
Cut the Red Tape, YOUTUBE (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=BtkuyWTphmQ. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Office of Budget & Spending, Remarks by President Trump on Deregu-
lation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-deregulation. 
 13. Robb Mandelbaum, Trump’s Regulation Order: What It Means For 
Small Businesses, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robbmandelbaum/2017/01/31/trumps-regulation-order-take-it-seriously-maybe 
-not-literally/#f2d0c895d375 (describing the organizations and interest groups 
that support the Order). 
 14. TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS, supra note 5, at 54. 
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In this Article, I evaluate the empirical and legal value of 
regulation counting studies in light of prevailing standards in 
social science research. I argue that regulation counting studies 
do not, and cannot, rationalize deregulatory policies like 2-for-1 
because they are, themselves, irrational and empirically un-
sound. The trouble with counting is that it does not measure var-
iables capable of yielding valid causal statistical inferences. The 
validity of empirical claims arising out of regulation counting 
studies depends on their proponents’ ability to demonstrate that 
regulation counts are an accurate measure of some relevant con-
struct, and to theorize and empirically establish a causal rela-
tionship between that construct and the economic outcomes of 
interest. In the social science literature, this is referred to as 
“construct validity.”15 It is commonly claimed that regulation 
counts are a proxy for the construct of costs or burdens on regu-
lated entities.16 While these claims have undeniable political ap-
peal, as I elaborate below, there are no good reasons to believe 
that counting the number of regulations is a useful proxy for the 
costs or burdens of regulation. If regulation counts are not a good 
proxy for mechanisms like cost or burden that are purported to 
affect economic outcomes, they have limited ability to support 
causal claims about the relationship between regulation and eco-
nomic outcomes. 
Why should anyone care about the empirical validity of a 
relatively small body of poorly (or cynically) conducted research? 
First, it is important to promote integrity in empirical research 
on regulation, because such research shapes regulatory policy.17 
 
 15. See generally Vladimir Atanasov & Bernard Black, Shock-Based Causal 
Inference in Corporate Finance Research, 5 CRITICAL FIN. REV. 207 (discussing 
“construct validity” and showing that the usefulness of a count variable requires 
theoretical construct validity); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate 
Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (2013) (demonstrating that count-
ing studies in corporate governance do not actually measure anything meaning-
ful). 
 16. These constructs tend to be vaguely defined in the literature, but they 
generally refer to the direct costs regulated entities incur to operate in compli-
ance with legal obligations or the opportunity costs of lost efficiency or produc-
tivity attributable to regulations. See infra note 223. 
 17. The use of unsound empirical studies is nothing new. Cost benefit anal-
ysis (CBA) was initially sold based on a suite of widely circulated regulatory 
scorecards that purported to demonstrate that the costs of government regula-
tions vastly outweigh their benefits. These studies have been debunked. See 
FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 35–40 (2004); Richard W. Parker, 
Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1347–48 (2003). The practice 
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Administrators are policy-makers who engage in fact-based de-
cision-making, and the facts upon which they rely often come 
from empirical research. Administrative decisions are only as 
sound as the research upon which they are based, thus there is 
a strong interest in promoting high quality research on regula-
tion. 
Second, empirical research is used by agencies to support 
their policies on judicial review. The Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA)18 requires agencies to articulate a rational connection 
between the facts before the agency and the policy choices made 
by the agency.19 Administrative decisions that lack a rational 
foundation are deemed arbitrary and capricious and must be 
struck down by reviewing courts.20 Agencies often cite empirical 
studies to demonstrate the rationality of their decisions, and re-
viewing courts will find agency decisions arbitrary and capri-
cious if they are not sufficiently justified by the empirical evi-
dence before the agency.21 
The logic of regulation counting studies that empirically tie 
regulation counts to macroeconomic outcomes appears calcu-
lated to resonate with widely accepted efficiency rationales for 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA, instituted through a series of 
executive orders issued by Presidents dating back to Jimmy 
Carter,22 rests on the premise that when agencies have the stat-
utory discretion to do so, they should make policy decisions in a 
 
of CBA has improved as it has assimilated critiques of cruder versions. See gen-
erally RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
OUR HEALTH (2008) (describing the need for cost-benefit analysis in the regula-
tory toolbox and how CBA’s flaws can be remedied). 
 18. 5 U.S.C. ch. 5 (2011). 
 19. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416–17 
(1971). 
 20. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1966); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.  
 21. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46 (rejecting Department of Transpor-
tation’s decision to rescind rule requiring passive restraints despite studies sug-
gesting that these requirements would increase seatbelt usage and save lives); 
Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (rejecting the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s proxy access rule for failing to include 
appropriately rigorous economic analysis regarding several of the issues before 
the agency). 
 22. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978) (Carter 
EO directing all executive agencies to improve existing and future regulations); 
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (Reagan EO reduc-
ing burdens for existing and future regulations); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (Clinton EO reforming and improving regulations 
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way that maximizes aggregate welfare, meaning the benefits of 
regulation net its costs.23 
There currently is broad scholarly and political consensus 
that “Presidents can legitimately influence the development of 
regulations—at least when the goal is to ensure that the regula-
tions promote societal welfare to the extent permitted by law.”24 
The requirement to maximize efficiency through administrative 
policy has been described colloquially as nothing more than the 
proposition “that agencies should attempt to produce more good 
than harm.”25 In fact, CBA has become so deeply entrenched in 
federal administrative policymaking that Cass Sunstein, a 
prominent former skeptic of CBA,26 now argues that it might be 
arbitrary and capricious if agencies fail to justify their decisions 
based on an analysis of quantified benefits and costs (absent 
statutory mandates prohibiting them from doing so).27 Some 
have interpreted recent U.S. Supreme Court case law to endorse 
this position.28 
It is not surprising, then, that supporters of EO 13,771 have 
suggested that 2-for-1 is merely an extension of cost-benefit 
analysis,29 and thus can be rationalized on similar grounds. The 
 
to maximize economic growth); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 
18, 2007) (Bush EO inserting CBA policies and preferences into regulatory pro-
cess); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011) (Obama EO 
directing agencies to streamline promulgation processes to better protect citi-
zens and to maximize economic benefits of the regulatory process). 
 23. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2017) [hereinafter CBA & Arbitrariness Review]. 
 24. Cecot & Livermore, supra note 3, at 3. 
 25. CBA & Arbitrariness Review, supra note 23, at 9. 
 26. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separa-
tion of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1267 (1981) (critiquing the executive branch’s 
use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool to control agency actions). 
 27. See CBA & Arbitrariness Review, supra note 23, at 9. 
 28. See Capping Regulation, supra note 3, at 5 (“Indeed, recent Supreme 
Court decisions have indicated that it would be unreasonable for agencies not 
to consider benefits and costs in making regulatory decisions.” (citing Michigan 
v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015))). 
 29. See Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 20, Pub. Cit-
izen, Inc. v. Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-253) (“Executive 
Order 13,771, like its predecessors, recognizes that agencies must inherently 
weigh conflicting goals, priorities, and associated costs as a necessary part of 
reasoned decisionmaking under the APA.”); see also TED GAYER, ROBERT LITAN 
& PHILIP WALLACH, BROOKINGS CTR. ON REGULATION & MKTS., EVALUATING 
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATORY REFORM PROGRAM 3 (2017), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/evaluatingtrumpreg 
reform_gayerlitanwallach_102017.pdf [hereinafter BROOKINGS EVALUATION] 
(situating EO 13,771 as part of a broader bipartisan effort to “require agencies 
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difficulty with this gambit is that 2-for-1 explicitly rejects the 
well-established efficiency maximization lodestar on which CBA 
rests. Contrary to CBA, 2-for-1 addresses only the costs (and not 
the benefits) of regulations, and the OMB Guidance Memoran-
dum implementing the Order expressly prohibits agencies from 
considering the benefits of regulation in deciding which regula-
tions must go and which may stay.30 This is, quite simply, unjus-
tifiable under fundamental principles of welfare economics: “At 
least as far as economic theory is concerned, any new regulation 
that offers more benefits than costs should be undertaken, regard-
less of its contribution to the aggregate regulatory cost to soci-
ety.”31 If EO 13,771 cannot be justified by the efficiency rationale 
underlying CBA, it must rest on some other principled basis. 
This is where regulation counting studies come in. They promise 
to provide empirical support for the policy of reducing regulation 
counts in the service of promoting desired (and ostensibly more 
efficient) macro-economic outcomes. This Article explains why 
they fail to deliver on that promise and, thus, why such studies 
cannot rationalize EO 13,771 or administrative decisions based 
on it.32 
Finally, it is important to understand the regulation count-
ing project on its own terms because it reveals deeper insights 
into the broader project of deregulation. Specifically, the practice 
 
to pay greater heed to analyzing the costs and benefits of major new regula-
tions . . . .”); BENJAMIN M. MILLER ET AL., RAND CORP., INCHING TOWARD RE-
FORM: TRUMP’S DEREGULATION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION (2017) (characteriz-
ing EO 13,771 as a way of forcing agencies to more accurately account for costs 
in their cost-benefit analyses); Susan Dudley et al., Consumer’s Guide to Regu-
latory Impact Analysis: Ten Tips for Being an Informed Policymaker, 8 J. BEN-
EFIT-COST ANALYSIS 2, 187, 190 (2017) (“The OMB’s guidance on [EO 
13,771] . . . may lead to an increased use of RIAs to examine the effects of mod-
ifying existing regulations, as well as prospective regulations.”). 
 30. See OMB GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 2. 
 31. BROOKINGS EVALUATION, supra note 29, at 5 (emphasis in original). 
 32. Decisions made pursuant to EO 13,771 cannot be justified based solely 
on the President’s power to direct executive agency policymaking. While the 
President has broad discretion to direct executive agencies to implement stat-
utes consistent with the administration’s policy preferences and priorities, the 
President does not have the power to direct agencies to make policy decisions 
that are arbitrary and capricious. See Pub. Citizen Health Res. Grp. v. Tyson, 
796 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See generally Steven G. Calabresi & 
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the Laws, 104 YALE 
L.J. 541 (1994) (explaining that the President’s reach of power is broad when 
executing laws that are consistent with the administration’s policy); Elena Ka-
gan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (same); 
Strauss, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that if the rules are appropriately 
adopted and do not question other authorities, they will generally be valid). 
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of regulation counting suggests that the true foundation of the 
deregulation movement lies not in concerns about economic effi-
ciency, but rather in fervent feelings and fears about regulation’s 
restrictions on liberty,33 particularly the freedom to conduct 
business. It is vital to recognize these feelings and fears as the 
wellspring of the deregulatory impulse if we ever are to advance 
legal and political debates about regulation. In the meantime, 
however, it is urgent to stress that inflamed regulatory passions 
cannot serve as a rational basis supporting regulatory reform 
policies implemented by agencies. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the meth-
odology of counting projects, including what counts and how it is 
counted. Part II lays out my critique of counting methodologies. 
I explain the necessity of construct and measurement validity for 
generating valid statistical inferences and then discuss why reg-
ulation counts are not a valid measure of any of the constructs 
that have been proffered by regulation counters, including the 
costs, burdens or constraints of regulation on regulated entities. 
Part III explores the question of what, if anything, regulation 
counts could signify even if they do not measure costs, burdens, 
or constraints on regulated entities. I suggest in this Part that 
regulation counts may be an attempt to represent what I call the 
“unquantifiable costs” of regulation, including regulation’s re-
strictions on liberty and the psychic burdens it imposes on cer-
tain segments of the business community. I argue that, standing 
alone, neither psychic burdens nor the desire to feel more free 
provide rational support for deregulatory counting policies. How-
ever, I argue that recognizing these unquantifiable costs of reg-
ulation could help advance dialogue about regulatory reform. Fi-
nally, Part IV discusses the very real harms and costs of the 
counting project and explains why it is time to stop counting and 
start engaging in meaningful dialogue about specific societal 
problems and appropriate regulatory responses. 
I.  WHAT COUNTS?   
The first and critical step in any counting project is to define 
the universe of things to be counted. That universe may be de-
fined capaciously, as it is by Count von Count, the Transylvanian 
expatriate on Sesame Street, whose sampling heuristic is: “there 
 
 33. See Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 633, 636–37 (2012) (demonstrating that concerns about regulation’s 
restrictions on liberty dominated debates about regulatory reform between 1980 
and 2005). 
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is always something to count.”34 Indeed, the Count will count 
whatever he encounters in his immediate sensory field, be it hot 
dogs, oranges, building floors, telephone rings, or even the sheep 
in his friends’ dreams.35 Below, I describe the variety of different 
approaches regulation counters have taken to define the things 
to be counted in their universe. Section A describes the counting 
methodology of EO 13,771. Section B discusses the largely dis-
credited methodologies that have traditionally been used in 
counting studies. Section C lays out the counting methodology 
used by RegData, which to date has not been scrutinized. This 
Article’s critique of counting focuses on RegData because it pur-
ports to be the state-of-the-art in regulation counting and has 
been marketed to government officials as a tool for deciding 
which regulations to cut. 
A. COUNTING METHODOLOGY OF EO 13,771 
Unlike many academic counting projects, EO 13,771 re-
quires agencies to count both regulations and costs.36 In addition 
to the 2-for-1 requirement, the Order implements a type of reg-
ulatory budget37 that requires agencies to offset fully the costs of 
 
 34. Sesame Street: Ernie Takes on the Count’s Job (PBS television broadcast 
May 4, 2000), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xkfU1pziqwg. 
 35. See, e.g., id. 
 36. EO 13,771, § 2(a) provides that “[u]nless prohibited by law, whenever 
an executive department or agency (agency) publicly proposes for notice and 
comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall identify at least 
two existing regulations to be repealed.” Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 
9339, 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). In furtherance of this requirement, EO 13,771 also 
requires that “any new incremental costs associated with new regulations shall, 
to the extent permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs 
associated with at least two prior regulations.” Id. 
 37. A regulatory budget is a shadow budget that caps the costs an agency 
can “require private agents to consume in the pursuit of the regulatory goal.” 
Robert W. Crandall, Federal Government Initiatives To Reduce the Price Level, 
1978 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 401, 429 (1978). The idea of a reg-
ulatory budget was introduced by Robert Crandall, who saw it as a way of “con-
fronting regulators with the costs of their actions.” Id. A variety of different 
models for implementing a regulatory budget have been proposed. See, e.g., 
Christopher C. DeMuth, The Regulatory Budget, REGULATION 29, 30–31 (1980) 
(proposing that the federal government “establish an upper limit on the costs of 
[federal] regulatory activities to the economy and . . . apportion this sum among 
the individual regulatory agencies”); Susan E. Dudley, Can Fiscal Budget Con-
cepts Improve Regulation? 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 265 (2016) 
(“Operationally, a regulatory budget would share similarities with the fiscal 
budget.”); Eric A. Posner, Using Net Benefit Accounts to Discipline Agencies: A 
Thought Experiment, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1473, 1477–84 (2002) (proposing a net 
benefit account budget, in which agencies would be required to keep positive 
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new regulations through the repeal of existing regulations.38 Ac-
cording to the OMB Guidance Memorandum, to comply with EO 
13,771, agencies must issue two deregulatory actions39 for each 
regulatory action.40 This requirement is meant to ensure that 
the incremental costs associated with the total number of regu-
latory actions are fully offset by the cost savings of deregulatory 
actions.41 
 
balances on ledgers that tally the benefits and costs of every regulation prom-
ulgated by the agency); Jeffrey A. Rosen & Brian Callanan, The Regulatory 
Budget Revisited, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 837 (2014) (suggesting that regulatory 
costs should be considered as the equivalent of tax dollars). Notably, most pre-
viously proposed regulatory budget designs envisioned involvement from Con-
gress as well as the executive branch. See BROOKINGS EVALUATION, supra note 
29, at 6–11. 
 38. Exec. Order No. 13,771 § 2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017). 
 39. The OMB Guidance Memorandum defines an “EO [13,771] deregula-
tory action” as an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than 
zero. OMB GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 4. EO 13,771 deregulatory actions are 
not limited to those actions that would be defined as significant under EO 
12,866, and they may be issued in a wide range of forms, including rulemaking; 
guidance or interpretive documents; or streamlining of information requests 
like recordkeeping, reporting, or disclosure requirements. Id. The OMB Memo-
randum explains that EO 13,771 regulatory actions subsequently overturned 
by Congress, for instance under the Congressional Review Act, count as “EO 
[13,771] deregulatory actions.” Id. at 7. By contrast, it takes a case-by-case ap-
proach to regulatory actions vacated by judicial order. See id. 
 40. OMB GUIDANCE defines “EO [13,771] regulatory action” as a “signifi-
cant regulatory action” that has been finalized, and that imposes total costs 
greater than zero. Id. at 3. “Significant regulatory action,” as defined by refer-
ence to EO 12,866, § 3(f ) , is defined in that EO as: 
any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that may: (1) Have 
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely 
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, produc-
tivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or 
State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious 
inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned 
by another agency; (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitle-
ments, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations 
of recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out 
of legal mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth 
in this Executive Order. 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993). The Memorandum ex-
plicitly includes significant guidance and interpretive documents in the defini-
tion of EO 13,771 regulatory actions. OMB GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 3. It 
specifies that the Order’s requirements apply to all EO 13,771 regulatory ac-
tions issued after noon on January 20, 2017. See id. at 1–2. 
 41. According to the Memorandum, only those regulatory impacts that have 
traditionally been counted as costs when taking a regulatory action should be 
counted as cost savings when taking an EO 13,771 deregulatory action. Id. at 9. 
In other words, cost savings that an agency has traditionally counted as benefits 
when taking regulatory action cannot be counted as reductions in costs for pur-
poses of EO 13,771 deregulatory actions. Thus, the guidance makes clear that 
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This methodology requires determining what counts as a 
regulatory or deregulatory action, and OMB has decided that the 
two will be distinguished by focusing on a particular set of costs. 
The OMB Guidance Memorandum provides that, generally, 
costs should be counted using the methods and concepts articu-
lated in OMB Circular A-4, which was released in 2003, to assist 
agencies in conducting cost-benefit analyses required under EO 
12866.42 However, costs are defined much more narrowly under 
EO 13,771. As has been widely observed and criticized,43 the only 
costs that count for purposes of EO 13,771 are compliance costs 
to regulated entities.44 For instance, lost benefits to the public or 
to regulated entities are not to be counted as costs of deregula-
tory actions.45 So, for instance, if an energy conservation regula-
tion produces measurable cost savings to regulated entities in 
 
agencies should not count net costs of deregulatory actions, but only those fi-
nancial impacts that would typically appear on the cost side of the cost-benefit 
analysis ledger in the initial regulatory analysis. See id. at 9. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Cecot & Livermore, supra note 3, at 3 (“We conclude that the Order 
is not calibrated to maximize social welfare because it narrowly focuses on the 
costs of regulation to regulated entities and fails to acknowledge the benefits of 
regulation.”); Capping Regulation, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting that it would 
be irrational not to consider net benefits to “distinguish a good rule from a bad 
rule.”); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Comments on OMB’s Interim Guidance Implement-
ing Section 2 of Executive Order 13,771 “Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs”, 42 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 7, 8 (2017) (asserting that the 
“overall main shortcoming” of EO 13,771 is “that it does not account for the 
benefit of regulations at all”); David A. Dana & Michael R. Barsa, The High 
Cost of Cutting Regulatory Costs, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www 
.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-epa-anti-regulatory-trump 
-epa-executive-order-perspec-0227-jm-20170223-story.html (“By focusing on 
only the costs of complying with the regulation, and not on the costs that the 
regulation is trying to prevent, Trump’s order puts us all at grave risk.”); Jody 
Freeman, Trump’s “2 for 1” Executive Order, ENVTL. L. HARV. (Jan. 30, 2017), 
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/freemanstatement (arguing that 
EO 13,771 would “strangle even the most beneficial rules under the guise of 
cutting red tape”); Amit Narang, The Stunning Triumph of Cost-Cost Analysis, 
REG. REV. (Feb. 19, 2017), http://www.regblog.org/2017/02/19/narang-stunning 
-triumph-cost-cost-analysis (“[T]he [Order] spells the end of cost-benefit analy-
sis and the rise of a new form of analysis that focuses only on regulatory costs 
while ignoring benefits.”). 
 44. If an agency is unsure whether an ambiguous item counts as a cost or 
a benefit, the Memorandum provides that it should be categorized to conform to 
accounting conventions the agency has followed in past analyses. So, for in-
stance, if the agency has historically categorized fuel savings associated with 
energy efficiency investments as benefits, it should continue to do so and should 
not count them as negative cost savings when deregulating. OMB GUIDANCE, 
supra note 2, at 9. 
 45. Id. 
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the form of lower energy costs, the loss of this benefit cannot be 
counted as a cost of repealing this regulation. 
Although EO 13,771 contains a cost parameter, straight-up 
regulation counting remains fundamental to its operation. Even 
if the repeal of a single existing regulation would fully offset the 
costs of a proposed regulation, the proposing agency still must 
identify a second regulation for repeal before proposing the new 
regulation. Any rule on the books is a candidate to be the second 
regulation repealed, so long as it imposes present costs greater 
than zero on regulated entities.46 
B. COUNTING METHODOLOGY OF REGULATION-COUNTING 
STUDIES 
In contrast to EO 13,771, counting studies typically count 
only regulations and not costs. This choice of object is odd in light 
of the fact, discussed below, that most regulation counters see 
the number of regulations as a proxy for the costs to regulated 
entities. Yet, instead of attempting to count those costs, they 
count regulations instead. 
Many regulation counting studies have taken a broad and 
undifferentiated approach to regulation counting, not unlike 
 
 46. The Memorandum clarifies the Order’s caveat that the 2-for-1 deal ap-
plies “unless prohibited by law.” Id. at 5. Regulatory actions that are statutorily 
or judicially required do not count for purposes of the EO 13,771 regulatory ac-
tion tally. See id. at 2. The Memorandum interprets a statutorily required reg-
ulatory action as one for which Congress has provided by statute both “an ex-
plicit requirement and explicit timeframe.” Id. at 5. For example, the following 
statute would be considered to statutorily require a regulatory action: The FDA 
“shall issue nutrition labeling requirements within 10 years” of the statute’s 
enactment date. Id. However, a statute that required the FDA to issue nutrition 
labeling requirements when necessary to promote the purposes of the statute 
would not be considered to statutorily require regulatory action. A judicially 
required regulatory action is one for which there is a “judicially established 
binding deadline for rulemaking, including deadlines established by settlement 
agreement or consent decree.” Id. The Memorandum further explains that EO 
13,771 does not change agencies’ obligations under statutes that prohibit the 
consideration of costs in determining a statutorily required standard. Id. at 8. 
However, it provides that while agencies may issue such regulations without 
first identifying offsetting deregulatory actions, they “will generally be required 
to offset the costs of such regulatory actions through other deregulatory actions 
taken pursuant to statutes that do not prohibit consideration of costs.” Id.  
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Count von Count’s. For instance, studies have counted the num-
ber of pages in the Federal Register47 or the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations (C.F.R.),48 or the number of bits49 in digitized state stat-
utory codes.50 Cross-national comparative studies have used 
indices derived from Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and World Bank data.51 Each of these 
 
 47. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COUNTING REGU-
LATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, 
AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER (2016); Regulators and Redskins, supra 
note 5, at 195–201. See generally TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS, supra note 
5. 
 48. See Dawson & Seater, supra note 5; Clyde W. Crews, New Data: Code 
of Federal Regulations Expanding, Faster Pace Under Obama, COMPETITIVE 
ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 17, 2014), https://cei.org/blog/new-data-code-federal 
-regulations-expanding-faster-pace-under-obama. 
 49. Bit is short for “binary digit” and is the smallest, most basic unit of data 
in computing. See Bit, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/ 
23954/bit (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); Bits and Bytes, STAN., https://web 
.stanford.edu/class/cs101/bits-bytes.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 50. See Mulligan & Shleifer, supra note 5, at 1469–72. 
 51. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh & Rita Ramalho, Regula-
tion & Growth, 92 ECON. LETTERS 395, 395–401 (2006); Norman V. Loayza, Ana 
María Oviedo & Luis Servén, Regulation & Macroeconomic Performance, in 
BUSINESS REGULATION AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (Norman V. Loayza & 
Luis Servén eds., 2010) (analyzing both World Bank and OECD data); Alberto 
Alesina et al., Regulation and Investment 1–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9560, 2003); Andrea Bassanini & Ekkehard Ernst, Labour 
Market Institutions, Product Market Regulation, & Innovation: Cross-Country 
Evidence 5–31 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 316, 2002); Daniel Kauf-
man, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate 
and Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2008 (World Bank Pol’y Research, 
Working Paper No. 4978, 2009); Norman V. Loayza, Ana María Oviedo & Luis 
Servén, The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality: Cross-Country 
Evidence 3 (World Bank, Working Paper No. S3623, 2005); Giuseppe Nicoletti 
et al., Product and Labor Market Interactions in OECD Countries 5–108 (OECD 
Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 312, 2001); Giuseppe Nicoletti & F. L. Pryor, 
Subjective & Objective Measures of the Extent of Governmental Regulations 4–
22 (OECD & Swarthmore College, Working Paper, 2001); Giuseppe Nicoletti & 
Stefano Scarpetta, Regulation, Productivity & Growth: OECD Evidence 5–63 
(OECD Econ. Dep’t., Working Paper No. 347, 2003); Giuseppe Nicoletti, Stefano 
Scarpetta & Olivier Boylaud, Summary Indicators of Product Market Regula-
tion with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation 7–84 (OECD Econ. 
Dep’t, Working Paper No. 226, 2000). This body of literature is beyond the scope 
of this article and has been thoroughly criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., THE QUIET 
POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION AND THE RULE 
OF LAW (Sally Engle Merry, Kevin E. Davis & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2015) 
(presenting case studies illustrating how global indices measuring regulation 
mask important issues of context and power); Janine Berg & Sandrine Cazes, 
Policymaking Gone Awry: The Labor Market Regulations of the Doing Business 
Indicators, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 349, 350 (2008) (arguing that the World 
Bank’s Doing Business index measures of labor market regulations are “based 
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counting methodologies has been roundly criticized for its inac-
curacy and inadequacy.52 The Federal Register contains not only 
final rules but proposed rules that may never become law, as 
well as public notices, executive orders, proclamations, and other 
presidential documents.53 In addition, many of its pages are con-
sumed by the extensive justifications that accompany final rules 
to satisfy the demands of arbitrary and capricious review.54 The 
C.F.R. codifies only finalized regulations, but “[p]age-count data 
are subject to the criticism that not all pages are equal. A page 
could be of enormous or trivial consequence to the economy.”55 
Digital file size measures suffer from similar defects in that they 
are totally undifferentiated as to content. These shortcomings 
introduce measurement error into studies employing these types 
of counts and undermine their empirical validity. 
C. COUNTING METHODOLOGY OF REGDATA 
The latest innovation in regulation counting methodology is 
the “Industry-specific Regulatory Constraint Database,” devel-
oped by researchers at the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University. Recently renamed “RegData,” presumably in an at-
tempt to mask its ideological pedigree, the database tallies the 
number of regulatory constraints applicable to different indus-
tries over the fifteen-year period from 1997–2012.56 The method-
ology used to count regulatory constraints is as follows: 
 
on a partial and crude understanding of how labor markets and their institu-
tions function”); Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of 
Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 
(2007) (highlighting the challenges of measuring country-level legal variables 
in the face of legal complexity and uncertainty); Alvaro Santos, Labor Flexibil-
ity, Legal Reform, and Economic Development, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 43, 45 (2009) 
(arguing that the World Bank Doing Business indicator “contains a number of 
very serious omissions that seem to stem from a flawed understanding of regu-
lation”). 
 52. See RegData, supra note 4, at 111–12; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, 
at 769–75. 
 53. See generally Federal Register, About the Federal Register, NAT’L AR-
CHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/the-federal-register/about 
.html (last updated Aug. 8, 2018) (detailing the types of sources included in the 
Federal Register). 
 54. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 772. 
 55. RegData, supra note 4, at 112; see also Dawson & Seater, supra note 5, 
at 139 (recognizing that “[a] counting measure obviously is imperfect in that two 
identical values may comprise regulations of different types and, even within a 
given type, may represent regulations of different stringency”). 
 56. RegData, supra note 4, at 109. 
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Regulatory texts typically use a relatively standard suite of verbs and 
adjectives to indicate a binding constraint, such as “shall,” “must,” and 
“prohibited.” This observation motivated us to search the CFR for key-
words that are likely to indicate binding constraints. As a departure 
point, we search for five strings that are likely to limit choice sets: 
“shall,” “must,” “may not,” “prohibited,” and “required.” We refer to this 
set of five strings as “restrictions.”57 
These search terms are the sole criteria applied to identify what 
counts as a regulatory constraint.58 The creators classify re-
strictions identified by this methodology by the industries to 
which they apply.59 
RegData is a particularly important development in the reg-
ulation counting project for four reasons. First, RegData claims 
to be the state-of-the-art in regulation counting, improving upon 
prior methods by counting only those provisions of the C.F.R. 
that impose regulatory demands60 or restrictions61 and by map-
ping those restrictions by industry, thus allowing for cross-in-
dustry comparisons of regulatory outcomes. Second, while prior 
counting methods have been thoroughly critiqued, including by 
the authors of RegData, the shortcomings of RegData have not 
yet been addressed. Third, RegData was recently made publicly 
available, together with a call that it be used to identify causal 
relationships between regulation counts and various macroeco-
nomic outcome variables of interest, including employment and 
productivity.62 It is important to clarify the meaning of the vari-
ables it has constructed in order to properly interpret any results 
produced by future studies. Fourth, RegData is being marketed 
to government officials as “a research platform that allows users 
to quickly analyze state regulations and identify the specific in-
dustries most targeted by excessive regulation.”63 It has been 
used by the Governor of Iowa to identify “onerous” regulations 
 
 57. Id. at 112. 
 58. Id. 
 59. The authors employ a complex methodology for industry coding that is 
described in Online Appendix B. Id. at app. B (describing their methodology for 
industry coding). I do not discuss this methodology here because it is outside 
the scope of the critique developed in this Article. Allocating regulations by in-
dustry does not mitigate any of the methodological problems identified below. 
 60. RegData, supra note 4, at 110. 
 61. Id. at 112. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Rod Boshart, Iowa Confident Alert System Won’t Send False Alarm, GA-
ZETTE (Jan. 16, 2018), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/government/ 
iowa-confident-alert-system-wont-send-false-alarm-20180116. 
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for repeal64 and by officials implementing a 2-for-1 policy in Brit-
ish Columbia, Canada,65 suggesting that RegData is poised to 
gain more widespread use by governments implementing regu-
lation counting policies and thus must be taken seriously not 
only as an intellectual project, but also a policy tool. For these 
reasons, RegData and its counting methodology will be the focus 
of this Article’s empirical critique. 
II.  THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTING   
This Part provides a basic introduction to the fundamental 
elements necessary to draw valid causal inferences from empir-
ical studies and explains why regulation counting studies lack 
these elements, illustrating key points with concrete examples 
drawn from the C.F.R. Empirical studies use quantified varia-
bles to measure observable phenomena in the world (for in-
stance, the costs of regulation or employment levels) and to es-
tablish their statistical relationship with one another. If certain 
conditions are met, quantitative studies can indicate causal re-
lationships between variables, establishing, for instance, that 
one observable phenomena (e.g. regulatory costs) is the cause of 
another (e.g. employment levels). 
The validity of a causal statistical inference depends on 
many factors, but the most basic and fundamental is measure-
ment validity, or the fit between a variable and the conceptual 
definition of the construct that the variable purports to measure. 
Stated simply, to produce valid statistical inferences, an explan-
atory variable must have a well-defined construct that is validly 
measured. A construct66 is a hypothetical condition or mecha-
nism explaining or predicting some outcome of interest. For in-
 
 64. Id. 
 65. LAURA JONES, MERCATUS CTR., CUTTING RED TAPE IN CANADA: A REG-
ULATORY RFORM MODEL FOR THE UNITED STATES? (2015), https://www 
.mercatus.org/system/files/Jones-Reg-Reform-British-Columbia.pdf. In addi-
tion to the province of British Columbia, various versions of the 2-for-1 policy 
have been adopted in other countries, including: Australia, Canada (federal), 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Nicho-
las Bellos, Is There an International Case for Trump’s “One-in-Two-Out” Order?, 
REG. REV. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/08/bellos 
-international-trump-order. 
 66. Different academic disciplines tend to use different statistical terminol-
ogy. I use the term construct as it tends to be used in sociology and psychology 
literature, to refer to an explanatory concept hypothesized to have a statistical 
relationship with an outcome variable. Economists tend to use the term con-
struct to refer to the observable measure of the underlying concept. 
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stance, intelligence is a construct that researchers might hypoth-
esize explains outcomes like academic achievement, income, or 
wealth. Constructs (like intelligence) cannot be directly observed 
or measured, and so they must be operationalized as variables 
for statistical analysis by measuring some observable and quan-
tifiable behavior or behavioral artifact. For instance, a re-
searcher who wishes to test the effects of the construct of intelli-
gence on particular outcomes might use IQ test scores as an 
observable proxy by which to measure it. 
The validity of a measure depends on the extent to which it 
accurately quantifies the construct it purports to assess. For in-
stance, it would be clearly invalid to use height as a measure of 
intelligence, because there is no plausible relationship between 
the construct (intelligence) and the measure (height). IQ scores 
present a more difficult case: while many dispute whether IQ 
scores measure intelligence,67 they are widely used in studies as 
a proxy for intelligence or similar constructs.68 Suppose the re-
searcher described above finds in her statistical analysis that 
higher IQ scores (the measure) are causally related to higher in-
comes (the outcome). May she make the claim that intelligence 
(the construct) causes higher incomes (the outcome)? This claim 
will be valid only if IQ scores (the measure) accurately measure 
intelligence (the construct). The onus is on the researcher to 
demonstrate the relationship between construct and measure 
that supports the causal claim she wishes to make. 
The fundamental problem with regulation counting projects 
is that they lack this rudimentary precondition of fit between 
construct and measure. This problem exists for two subsidiary 
reasons. First, as discussed in Section A below, the construct op-
erationalized through the methodology of regulation counting is 
ill-defined, making both measurement and causal inference dif-
ficult, if not impossible. Second, as discussed in Section B.1–8 
 
 67. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci & Jeffrey K. Liker, A Day at the Races: A Study 
of IQ, Expertise, and Cognitive Complexity, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 255, 
255 (1986) (arguing that “IQ is unrelated to real-world forms of cognitive com-
plexity that would appear to conform to some of those that scientists regard as 
the hallmarks of intelligent behavior”). 
 68. See, e.g., LEWIS M. TERMAN & MAUD A. MERRILL, MEASURING INTELLI-
GENCE: A GUIDE TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NEW REVISED STANFORD-BI-
NET TESTS OF INTELLIGENCE (1949) (claiming that IQ tests measure intelli-
gence); William W. Brown & Morgan O. Reynolds, A Model of IQ, Occupation, 
and Earnings, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 1002 (1975) (using IQ test scores as a proxy 
for intelligence); Jay L. Zagorsky, Do You Have to Be Smart to Be Rich? The 
Impact of IQ on Wealth, Income and Financial Distress, 35 INTELLIGENCE 489 
(2007) (using IQ test scores as a proxy for intelligence). 
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below, the constructs that have been articulated by regulation 
counters cannot be measured accurately by counting the number 
of regulations or regulatory requirements in the C.F.R. 
A. CONSTRUCT DEFINITION 
A threshold problem with regulation counts is that it is not 
entirely clear what construct they are supposed to be measuring, 
or if they are meant to measure any construct at all. A count is 
nothing more than a number—like the number of telephone 
rings69—unless it accurately measures some validly theorized 
explanatory construct. Regulation counts are often presumed to 
measure constructs like the costs or burdens of regulation. How-
ever, regulation counters have been reluctant to clearly define 
and theorize a stable, coherent construct that is accurately meas-
ured by regulation counts. This makes it difficult to know exactly 
what regulation counts measure and undermines causal claims 
based on them.70 
Some regulation counters do not bother to supply an explan-
atory construct, or seem to believe that the count of regulations 
is, itself, an explanatory construct that is causally related to out-
come variables of interest.71 This is like claiming that the num-
ber of pages in the Yellow Pages causes traffic accidents. Now, it 
 
 69. Note that the number of telephone rings could be transformed into a 
construct if it had some significance independent of the absolute number—for 
instance, if the number of rings encoded some kind of message from caller to 
receiver. There is no indication in the Sesame Street sketch referenced above 
that the Count’s caller is sending him an encoded message. 
 70. See Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance Indices and Con-
struct Validity, 25 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 397, 398 (2017) (even if in-
dependent variables are properly measured, causal claims can fail “because the 
underlying theory that posits a relationship between the general aspect (board 
structure) and the outcome is wrong”). 
 71. See, e.g., HOWARD BEALES ET AL., REGULATORY TRANSPARENCY PRO-
JECT, GOVERNMENT REGULATION: THE GOOD, THE BAD, & THE UGLY (2017), 
https://regproject.org/paper/government-regulation-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly 
(arguing, among other things, that “regulatory accumulation” is detrimental to 
the American economy); TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS, supra note 5 (focus-
ing throughout the report on pages in the C.F.R. devoted to final rules to deter-
mine regulatory burdens); JONES, supra note 65, at 22–24 (arguing that British 
Columbia’s reduction in the number of regulations is the reason for the turn-
around in its economy); Ronald Bailey, Federal Regulations Have Made You 75 
Percent Poorer, REASON (June 21, 2013), http://reason.com/archives/2013/06/21/ 
federal-regulations-have-made-you-75-per (arguing that “six decades of accu-
mulated regulations” are responsible for suppressing the growth of GDP and 
household income); Michael Mandel, Pebbles in the Stream: Does the FDA Slow 
Medical Technology Innovation?, MANDEL ON INNOVATION & GROWTH (Dec. 4, 
2010), https://innovationandgrowth.wordpress.com/2010/12/04/pebbles-in-the 
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may be the case that the number of pages in the Yellow Pages is 
a reasonable proxy for the number of people living in a particular 
locality, which may be a reasonable proxy for traffic volume, 
which might be causally related to the number of traffic acci-
dents. But it cannot be the case that the number of pages in the 
phone book causes traffic accidents. In this example, the girth of 
the Yellow Pages is merely the measure of the explanatory con-
struct, traffic volume. To draw meaningful inferences from a sta-
tistical relationship between the Yellow Pages and traffic acci-
dents, there must be some valid theory positing a relationship 
between the two.72 Similarly, the number of regulations, stand-
ing alone, has no causal significance unless it can be shown to be 
a proxy for some other causal mechanism driving economic out-
comes. 
More sophisticated regulation counters have recognized the 
need for an explanatory construct to hypothesize causal relation-
ships. However, the constructs they have supplied are poorly de-
fined, under-theorized, and in tension with one another. It has 
been claimed that regulation counts operationalize constructs 
 
-stream-does-the-fda-slow-medical-technology-innovation (comparing regula-
tions to pebbles in a stream, which dam the stream when there are too many); 
Jared Meyer, Regulation’s Stranglehold on Millennials’ Futures, FORBES (May 
25, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2015/05/25/regulations 
-stranglehold-on-millennials-futures/#7cd2a62e2f39 (arguing that the “sheer 
quantity of government red tape” hampers economic growth); Will Yakowicz, 
Why Regulation Is Ruining the U.S. Economy, INC. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www 
.inc.com/will-yakowicz/why-regulation-is-ruining-us-economy.html (suggesting 
the number of regulations, and removing unnecessary ones, will jumpstart the 
economy). 
 72. See Black et al., supra note 70, at 398 (asserting that even if independ-
ent variables are properly measured, causal claims can fail “because the under-
lying theory that posits a relationship between the general aspect (board struc-
ture) and the outcome is wrong”). 
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like regulatory costs,73 regulatory burdens,74 or regulatory con-
straints,75 or that they “probably capture[] at least some of reg-
ulation’s complexity.”76 Rarely is it clear what the focal construct 
is, because these constructs have been used interchangeably. 
This construct shell game severely undercuts the empirical 
validity of regulation counting studies because the different con-
structs do not necessarily mean the same thing. A burden, for 
instance, may not come in the form of economic costs. As dis-
cussed below, the costs of regulation may be to liberty or to the 
psychic well-being of regulated business owners. Costs that have 
big payoffs, like the expense of applying for an offshore drilling 
lease, are not properly characterized as burdens. Constraints—
like requirements that everyone drive on the same side of the 
road—may not be particularly costly or burdensome or complex. 
Indeed, as this example illustrates, constraints often increase so-
cial welfare by solving collective action problems in ways that 
benefit everyone, including regulated businesses.77 A world 
 
 73. See Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); OMB 
GUIDANCE, supra note 2; BROOKINGS EVALUATION, supra note 29, at 6 (calling 
the 2-for-1 requirement “a blunt institutional reform to rein in regulatory 
costs”); Dudley, supra note 37, at 262 (suggesting an association between regu-
lation counts and regulatory costs). 
 74. Dawson & Seater, supra note 5, at 143 (explaining their construct as 
follows: “It seems reasonable to suppose that the number of pages required to 
describe regulatory requirements varies directly with the number of require-
ments, at least on average. Our page count measure therefore should capture 
whatever regulatory burden is reflected in the number of regulatory require-
ments”); Andrew Hale, David Borys & Mark Adams, Regulatory Overload: A 
Behavioral Analysis of Regulatory Compliance 2–5 (Mercatus Ctr., Working Pa-
per No. 11-47, 2011) (citing the volume of regulations taken with their complex-
ity and style to argue they create a regulatory overload that must be managed 
and adjusted); see also Tyler Cowen, More Freedom on the Airplane, if Nowhere 
Else, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/ 
business/more-freedom-on-the-airplane-if-nowhere-else.html (arguing that 
when there are more regulations, compliance for regulated entities becomes dif-
ficult and burdensome). 
 75. RegData, supra note 4, at 112; see also Mandel, supra note 71 (compar-
ing regulations to pebbles in a stream, which, like a dam, constrain the flow 
when there are too many). 
 76. Dawson & Seater, supra note 5, at 139–40. Complexity is rarely cited 
as the focal construct explaining economic outcomes. Rather, complexity tends 
to be subsidiary to constructs like cost, which are ultimately said to drive eco-
nomic outcomes. 
 77. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIV-
ING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990) (arguing that regulation often increases so-
cial welfare by solving collective action or coordination problems and by mini-
mizing decision costs). 
  
114 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:93 
 
without traffic regulations would be a very costly place to con-
duct business. By contrast, clear-cut regulatory commands may 
not be especially complex, but might still be quite costly. For in-
stance, the regulation requiring automakers to achieve a Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy rating of 54.4 miles per gallon by the 
year 2025 is reasonably straightforward as regulatory com-
mands go, but many have claimed that it would be very costly 
for automakers and consumers.78 
In sum, each of the proffered constructs presents a different 
set of potential causal relationships with business activity and 
economic outcomes. Yet regulation counting studies have stren-
uously avoided tying regulation counts concretely to a single con-
struct and theorizing the relationship between that particular 
construct and economic outcomes of interest. This may be be-
cause, as some regulation counters have acknowledged, eco-
nomic theory would equally support a positive or a negative as-
sociation between regulation and economic activity.79 Or it may 
be because mutable constructs enhance the utility of regulation 
counts as a political tool, allowing regulation counters to speak 
to different audiences and deflect criticism by subtly shifting 
their rhetoric in response to challenges. If someone points out 
that regulations often save money, the political regulation coun-
ter can respond that the problem is really about stifling innova-
tion or increasing complexity. If someone points out that regula-
tions often spur innovation, the political regulation counter can 
respond that the real problem is cost. Whatever the reason, the 
lack of a well-defined, theoretically justified construct measured 
by regulation counts makes it implausible to draw causal infer-
ences from any statistical associations found between these 
counts and economic outcome variables. 
There is one dimension of regulation counting constructs 
that tends to be reasonably well defined, but it only further com-
plicates the credible theorization of causal relationships between 
 
 78. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Obama Ad-
ministration Finalizes Historic 54.5 MPG Fuel Efficiency Standards (Aug. 28, 
2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/28/ 
obama-administration-finalizes-historic-545-mpg-fuel-efficiency-standard; see 
also Juliet Eilperin & Steve Overly, Automakers Ask EPA To Overturn Recent 
Review of Fuel-Efficiency Standards, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/automakers-ask-epa-to-overturn 
-recent-review-of-fuel-efficiency-standards/2017/02/22/81ad1398-f920-11e6 
-9845-576c69081518_story.html. 
 79. See, e.g., Dawson & Seater, supra note 5, at 145. 
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the regulation count and economic outcome variables. Regula-
tion counters tend to agree that regulation counts are only meant 
to capture the costs or burdens or constraints impacting private 
entities subject to regulation rather than the aggregate net costs 
(or benefits or burdens or constraints) to society.80 This concep-
tualization flies in the face of fundamental tenets of welfare eco-
nomics and marginalism.81 The tally of gross costs on one subset 
of market actors reveals little about prices, behavior, or effi-
ciency in the broader market. To date, regulation counters have 
not explicitly justified the theoretical significance of tallies 
measuring gross costs/burdens/constraints on one set of eco-
nomic actors, unmitigated by benefits accruing to those same ac-
tors and divorced from their relationship to costs (and benefits) 
accruing to other market actors. Thus, it is not at all clear what 
construct regulation counters purport to measure when they 
measure costs, burdens, or constraints only on regulated enti-
ties, unless that construct is a select subset of the costs, burdens, 
or constraints borne by a favored set of political allies. 
Thus, in addition to the more technical issues of measure-
ment validity elaborated below, the opacity, indeterminacy, and 
outright bias in the overarching constructs purportedly meas-
ured by regulation counts undermine the ability of regulation 
counters to support causal empirical claims about the relation-
ship between regulation counts and economic outcomes. 
B. MEASURE VALIDITY 
Even if a plausible theory to justify the constructs of cost, 
burden, or constraint on regulated entities could be developed, 
the problem remains that regulation counts do not validly meas-
ure said constructs. As I argue below, regulation counting does 
not and cannot measure the costs, burdens, or constraints on 
regulated entities because it does not account for at least nine 
important features of regulatory law: (1) variation in the weight 
of regulations; (2) variation in regulations’ scope of coverage; (3) 
the object of regulatory requirements; (4) structural relation-
ships between and among regulations; (5) basic grammar and 
punctuation; (6) the fact that many regulatory requirements re-
late to the dispensation of government largess to regulated enti-
ties; (7) the fact that regulated entities enjoy other monetizable 
benefits from robust regulation; (8) variations in the rigor with 
 
 80. See, e.g., RegData, supra note 4, at 112 (counting keywords in the C.F.R. 
that are likely to “limit choice sets” of economic actors). 
 81. BROOKINGS EVALUATION, supra note 29, at 5. 
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which regulations are enforced, up to and including total non-
enforcement; and (9) the fact that Congress, and not the admin-
istering agency, is the direct source of many regulatory require-
ments. 
To be fair, regulation counters have acknowledged the limi-
tations of the measure to a point, but they tend to dismiss them 
casually. As one study explains, “[a] counting measure obviously 
is imperfect in that two identical values may comprise regula-
tions of different types and, even within a given type, may rep-
resent regulations of different stringency.”82 But the authors dis-
miss this concern by noting that “if there are many kinds of 
regulation . . . , it is reasonable to expect an index to provide a 
useful overall measure of regulation.”83 Of course, the validity of 
this claim depends on the contents of the index, and these au-
thors display no understanding of the rudiments of regulatory 
law that comprise their index. Similarly, the authors of RegData 
allow that “just as one page [of the C.F.R.] may not be equal to 
another page [of the C.F.R.], one restriction may carry more con-
sequence than another.”84 Nonetheless, they suggest that this 
defect is mitigated by the fact that RegData measures re-
strictions of different weights at “different levels of granularity” 
(meaning by title, chapter, part, and paragraph of the C.F.R.), 
without explaining how measurement error nets out if measured 
at different levels.85 
Some regulation counters have dismissed criticism of their 
measure by arguing, circularly, that regulation counts must be a 
valid measure because they are correlated with macroeconomic 
outcome variables like growth and productivity, and there would 
be no correlation if the count variable were just noise.86 This jus-
tification ignores the fact that it is trivially easy to generate spu-
rious correlations using regression analysis:87 for instance, the 
finding that between 2000 and 2009, per capita cheese consump-
tion in the United States was highly correlated with the number 
 
 82. Dawson & Seater, supra note 5, at 139. 
 83. Id. 
 84. RegData, supra note 4, at 112. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Dawson & Seater, supra note 5, at 139. 
 87. See Atanasov & Black, supra note 15 (investigating shock-based causal 
inferences); Black et al., supra note 70 (demonstrating how easy it is to generate 
correlations through regression analysis). 
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of people who died by becoming tangled in their bedsheets.88 In-
deed, regulation counters have called into question the facial va-
lidity of their own measure by demonstrating in a recent study a 
spurious correlation between the number of pages in the Federal 
Register and the winning percentage of the Washington Red-
skins.89 
Despite recognizing the limitations of regulation counts as a 
measure, counters tend to conclude that these counts are a good-
enough composite of something that is very difficult to measure. 
One of RegData’s creators likens regulation counting to saber-
metrics, an approach to baseball team management popularized 
by the movie Moneyball and my hometown team, the Oakland 
A’s.90 “When working with a complex system, whether it’s the 
economy, or even a baseball team, it is important to measure its 
inputs and components if you want to advance the performance 
of that system. RegData is a new database that does just that.”91 
This Section challenges regulation counters’ blithe dismis-
sals of measurement criticism by demonstrating three key 
points. First, there is extreme incommensurability between dif-
ferent items that count the same in regulation counts. In saber-
metrics terms, this would be like counting all hits the same, 
without respect to whether they are singles, doubles, triples or 
home runs or whether they occurred with runners in scoring po-
sition or during other key moments in the game. Sure, it’s nice 
to know how many hits a player has in a season, but the point of 
sabermetrics is to predict the value that a player’s hits are likely 
to add to the team over the course of a season and to help man-
agers make decisions about which players to use in which situa-
tions in order to maximize that value. Sabermetrics attempts to 
achieve this goal by appropriately weighting and discounting dif-
ferent types of hits in different contexts.92 Like Sabermetrics, 
RegData is being marketed as a decision-making tool that can 
 
 88. Tyler Vigen, Spurious Correlations, TYLERVIGEN.COM, http://www 
.tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 
 89. See generally Regulators and Redskins, supra note 5. 
 90. Patrick McLaughlin, The Science of Government Regulation, U.S. NEWS 
(Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/ 
2012/10/31/the-science-of-government-regulation. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Zachary D. Rymer, Sabermetrics for Dummies: How-to Guide for 
MLB Fans to Learn the Ropes, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 25, 2014), https:// 
bleacherreport.com/articles/2040748-sabermetrics-for-dummies-how-to-guide 
-for-mlb-fans-to-learn-the-ropes (explaining sabermetrics for evaluating hit-
ting, pitching, and player contributions to the team). 
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help government officials make complex calls about how to reg-
ulate;93 but unlike Sabermetrics, RegData does not tell them 
whether any given regulation is a single, a double, or a home 
run, or whether it is likely to score a run, which is ultimately 
what matters at the end of the day. 
Second, my analysis reveals rampant double (and triple, and 
more) counting of regulatory requirements. This means that 
even the absolute number counted is wrong. Third, my analysis 
demonstrates that the regulations counted are not only of differ-
ent weight, but also of different directional effect. As demon-
strated below, many regulations or regulatory commands lessen 
the costs, burdens, or constraints on regulated entities, and yet 
regulation counters add them to the tally of costs, burdens, or 
constraints on regulated entities rather than subtracting them 
from the count. This is more than mere noise—it affirmatively 
misrepresents the nature and magnitude of what is purportedly 
being measured. This type of measurement error does not net 
out as more data gets collected, like outlier games in a pitcher’s 
earned run average. Rather, it compounds itself. It is like adding 
every game a pitcher starts to the “win” column of her record 
without paying attention to the direction the game went. Regu-
lation counters have never grappled seriously with the biases 
these defects introduce into their measures and any statistical 
analyses conducted using them, and the empirical claims arising 
from those analyses, cannot be taken seriously unless they do. 
1. Counting Does Not Account for Weight 
Regulation counts do not account for the weight of the things 
counted. This is a fundamental flaw if regulation counts are 
meant to measure regulatory costs, burdens, or constraints on 
regulated entities. The burden of carrying 1,000 feathers is very 
different from the burden of carrying 1,000 anvils, yet regulation 
counts make no attempt to differentiate between regulatory 
feathers and anvils. So, for example, in RegData the command 
that mine operators “shall” supply their official address and tel-
ephone number on documents submitted to the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration94 is counted just the same as the com-
mand that automakers “must comply with”95 the complex and 
 
 93. Cf. Patrick McLaughlin et al., RegData 3.0 User’s Guide, QUANTGOV, 
https://quantgov.org/regdata/users-guide (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) (discussing 
the potential uses for RegData and the sorts of problems it can help solve). 
 94. 30 C.F.R. § 41.30 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 95. 40 C.F.R. § 86.1818-12(a)(1) (2017) (emphasis added). 
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demanding greenhouse gas fleet average requirements detailed 
in EPA regulations. Adding these two wildly incommensurate 
requirements together does not provide an accurate measure of 
the costs, burdens, or constraints of regulation on regulated en-
tities. 
2. Counting Does Not Account for the Scope of Coverage 
Regulation counts do not account for the breadth or narrow-
ness in applicability of particular regulatory requirements. For 
instance, Subpart 3430 of the C.F.R. contains several regulatory 
requirements applicable to Preference Right Leases granted by 
the Bureau of Land Management for coal prospecting on federal 
lands.96 However, these requirements apply only to leases issued 
prior to August 4, 1976.97 Such leases represent roughly a third 
of federal coal prospecting leases.98 Yet, mandatory terms iden-
tified in Subpart 3430 measure the same quantity of cost, bur-
den, or constraint as those identified in Part 3470, which applies 
to all federal coal prospecting leases.99 
Some regulations apply to even smaller populations. For in-
stance, Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations provide man-
datory criteria that must be met to receive a financial reward for 
disclosing information relating to the unlawful introduction, 
manufacture, acquisition, export, loss, or diversion of atomic 
weapons and special nuclear materials.100 These regulations con-
tain directive language demanding that the information “must 
be original, and must concern”101 unlawful conduct. However, 
these mandates apply only to the thimble-full of individuals who 
possess information about unlawful activities relating to atomic 
weapons and who wish to obtain a financial reward for disclosing 
it to the DOJ.102 Nonetheless, RegData counts such narrowly ap-
 
 96. See 43 C.F.R. pt. 3430, subpart 3430 (2017). 
 97. Id. § 3430.0.7. 
 98. Frequently Asked Questions About the Federal Coal Leasing Program, 
U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR: BUREAU LAND MGMT., https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl 
-front-office/projects/nepa/64842/78268/88489/CoalFAQ.pdf (last visited Oct. 
15, 2018). 
 99. See 43 C.F.R. § 3430.6-1 (“Each preference right lease shall be subject 
to the terms provided for Federal coal leases established in part 3470 of this 
title.”). 
 100. 28 C.F.R. § 13.6(a) (2017). 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. §§ 13.1–13.2. 
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plicable mandates as commensurate with, for instance, Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration requirements that ap-
ply to millions of U.S. workplaces.103 
3. Counting Does Not Account for the Object of Regulatory 
Requirements 
Baked into the construct definition of most counting projects 
is the assumption that private regulated entities are the objects 
of regulatory mandates—that they are the actors bearing the 
costs, burdens, or constraints of regulation. However, large 
swaths of the C.F.R. do not even apply to regulated entities, but 
rather constrain the government’s actions, typically for the ben-
efit and protection of regulated entities. 
Title 1 regulates government actions relating to governmen-
tal functions like enacting and publishing laws. For example, it 
provides that certain specified documents “are required to be 
filed for public inspection with the Office of the Federal Register 
and published in the FEDERAL REGISTER”104 and mandates that 
each document so published “shall be keyed to the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations.”105 These regulations impose no burden what-
soever on regulated entities and, instead, require government 
transparency and regularity for the benefit of all citizens, includ-
ing regulated entities and their lawyers.106 
The federal government is likewise the primary object of the 
regulatory constraints found in Title 2, administering govern-
ment grants and agreements. For instance, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget regulations require that granting agencies 
“must ensure” the adequacy of their information processing sys-
tems related to awards107 and “must include” a variety of infor-
mation about the award as well as instructions for applicants in 
all program announcements.108 These regulations also contain 
detailed guidelines about the policies and procedures that agen-
cies “[m]ust establish”109 to govern debarment and suspension, 
 
 103. Cf. supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text (describing the counting 
methodology of RegData). 
 104. 1 C.F.R. § 5.2 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. § 5.5 (emphasis added). 
 106. Cf. id. §§ 5.1–5.3 (laying out the policy and requirements behind the 
publication of documents in the FEDERAL REGISTER). 
 107. 2 C.F.R. § 25.215 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 108. Id. § 170.200(a) (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. § 180.25(a) (emphasis added). 
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including prohibiting agencies from making awards to sus-
pended or debarred persons.110 Subpart B of Title 2 codifies reg-
ulations promulgated by thirty-two different agencies separately 
adopting the OMB guidance regulating grants and agreements, 
using similar mandatory language multiplied many times 
over.111 
Title 3, Chapter I, provides standards of conduct for employ-
ees in the Executive Office of the President.112 Title 4, Chapter 
I, applies to the Government Accountability Office and contains 
thirty-six regulations using the word “must” and 148 regulations 
using the word “shall,” including requirements about the hours 
during which the GAO building “shall” be open to the public.113 
Title 5 contains extensive regulation of administrative person-
nel, including 1,420 regulations using “shall” and 1,781 using 
“must.”114 Title 11 regulates federal elections.115 Regulations in 
Title 28, Chapter I, pertain exclusively to the Department of Jus-
tice and govern issues like parole, release, supervision and re-
commitment of prisoners,116 implementation of the Equal Access 
to Justice Act,117 and death sentence procedures.118 These regu-
lations have no applicability whatsoever to regulated businesses, 
except perhaps to protect those that find themselves caught up 
in the federal criminal justice system. Title 39 applies exclu-
sively to the Postal Service, and contains 610 regulations with 
“shall” and 227 with “must.”119 The regulations in 41 C.F.R. Sub-
 
 110. Id. § 180.400. 
 111. See Id. §§ 200.100–.113 
 112. E.g., 3 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2017) (stating that “[u]ntil further regulations 
are promulgated, the remainder of the entities within the Executive Office of 
the President, to the extent that 5 U.S.C. § 552 is applicable, shall follow the 
procedures set forth in the regulations applicable to the Office of Management 
and Budget (5 CFR Ch. III)” (emphasis added)). 
 113. 4 C.F.R. § 25.3 (2017) (“During normal working hours, the GAO Build-
ing shall be open to the public unless specific circumstances require it to be 
closed to the public to ensure the orderly conduct of government business.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 114. E.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2638.306 (2017) (“The agency must provide each em-
ployee upon initial appointment to a supervisory position with the written in-
formation required under this section.” (emphasis added)). 
 115. 11 C.F.R. ch. I (2017). 
 116. 28 C.F.R. pt. 2. 
 117. Id. pt. 24. 
 118. Id. pt. 26. 
 119. E.g., 39 C.F.R. § 447.21(b) (2017) (“No employee shall take sick leave to 
enable himself to engage in outside work.”). 
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title C relate to the government’s management of its own prop-
erty.120 For instance, Section 102 of this subtitle contains man-
dates relating to the fuel economy standards of government ve-
hicle fleets.121 
In addition to government-focused regulations occupying 
large and discrete parts or titles of the C.F.R., agency-constrain-
ing regulations are woven throughout the agency-specific titles 
of the C.F.R. Extensive, agency-specific regulations bind agen-
cies to observe certain procedures in order to comply with the 
Administrative Procedure Act,122 the Freedom of Information 
Act,123 the Government in the Sunshine Act,124 and due process 
requirements, thus effectuating important statutory and consti-
tutional protections for regulated entities. Other regulatory 
mandates directed towards the government constrain agency 
discretion by specifying the factors an agency must consider in 
deciding certain issues. For instance, regulations implementing 
the Endangered Species Act contain requirements governing 
how the Secretary of the Interior “shall review” applications for 
exemptions from the statute’s take provisions.125 
In addition, many federal regulatory mandates that arise in 
the context of cooperative federalism programs and block grant 
programs apply to state governments, not to private entities. For 
instance, 40 C.F.R. § 256.20 contains requirements applicable to 
state solid waste disposal programs.126 Medicare and Medicaid 
regulations likewise impose extensive requirements on state 
governments that have elected to receive federal funding under 
these programs.127 
The failure to account for the fact that regulated entities are 
the object of only a fraction of the requirements found in the 
C.F.R. significantly distorts the accuracy of regulation counts as 
a measure of the cost, burden, or constraint of regulation on reg-
ulated entities.128 
 
 120. 41 C.F.R. subtitle C (2017). 
 121. 41 C.F.R. § 102-34 (2017). 
 122. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (2017). For instance, in certain matters appealed to 
the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary is required by regulation to provide 
public notice of the appeal, take comments, and evaluate the comments in spec-
ified ways. 15 C.F.R. § 930.128 (a)–(c) (2017). 
 123. 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
 124. Id. § 552b. 
 125. 50 C.F.R. § 451.02 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 126. 40 C.F.R. § 256.20 (2017). 
 127. 42 C.F.R. § 403.304 (2017). 
 128. While regulation counters may see regulations constraining federal and 
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4. Counting Does Not Account for Structural Relationships 
Among Regulations 
Counting the absolute number of regulations or regulatory 
commands does not account for interrelationship between and 
among regulations and their subparts. Indeed, in many cases, 
the existence of multiple regulations or regulatory commands 
can result in fewer burdens and more flexibility for regulated 
entities. I identify four such cases below: exceptions, alterna-
tives, reference to other regulations, and elaboration or clarifica-
tion of regulatory requirements. 
a. Exceptions 
Many regulations containing regulatory commands are 
qualified by explicitly articulated exceptions. Some exceptions 
are so numerous or so broad that they swallow the rule. Yet reg-
ulation counters count these regulations or commands the same 
way that they count unqualified regulations or commands.129 
For instance, importers of agricultural products like dates 
can unilaterally exempt their products from USDA grade, size, 
quality, and maturity requirements in a variety of ways, includ-
ing: by donating nonconforming products to “needy persons, pris-
oners, or Native Americans”130 or by designating them for pro-
cessing.131 Taking one of these unilateral actions alleviates date 
importers from the multiple mandatory requirements of 7 C.F.R. 
§ 999.1.132 Similar exemptions are available for importers of wal-
nuts,133 prunes,134 raisins,135 and filberts.136 The Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission exempts from classification as “fissile mate-
rial” and compliance with associated regulatory requirements 
that fissile material which meets any one of six criteria.137 The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation exempts ten different 
 
state government agencies as costly and burdensome as well, this relationship 
is nowhere theorized. Such a claim would need to be explicitly articulated and 
supported. In the absence of such support, it is impermissible to claim that the 
number of regulations on government entities accurately measures the costs, 
burdens, or constraints on regulated entities. 
 129. See, e.g., supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 130. 7 C.F.R. § 999.1(d)(2) (2017). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. § 999.1. 
 133. Id. § 999.100(d)(2). 
 134. Id. § 999.200(d). 
 135. Id. § 999.300(e). 
 136. Id. § 999.400(d). 
 137. 10 C.F.R. § 71.15 (2017). 
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types of advertisements from its requirements governing adver-
tising by federally insured depository institutions.138 The De-
partment of Health and Human Services exempts several cate-
gories of health care providers from immunization reporting 
requirements.139 
Federal Trade Commission regulations allow “[a]ny person 
who believes a particular hazardous substance intended or pack-
aged in a form suitable for use in the household or by children 
[to] be exempted from full label compliance otherwise applicable 
under the act”140 upon a showing that “full compliance is imprac-
ticable or is not necessary for the protection of the public 
health.”141 While the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Coast Guard generally require inspected vessels to maintain life-
saving systems with mandated features, vessels are exempt from 
these requirements if they can demonstrate that they would be 
“unreasonable or unnecessary”142 due to the nature of the vessel 
and its voyage routes or that they would “seriously impede re-
search”143 into novel vessel designs. Many research and develop-
ment activities are similarly exempted from the disclosure re-
quirements of the Toxic Substances Control Act.144 
Even where regulatory requirements are not explicitly qual-
ified by exceptions in the text of the C.F.R., exceptions may be 
granted by administrative agencies under statutory authority 
and principles of “administrative equity.”145 For example, the 
Department of Energy Act authorizes the Secretary of Energy to 
make “adjustments” to duly enacted regulations, including ex-
ceptions, exemptions, modifications, and interpretations.146 
Other statutes and regulations empower agencies to provide 
 
 138. 12 C.F.R. § 328.3(d) (2017). 
 139. 42 C.F.R. § 495.22 (2017). 
 140. 16 C.F.R. § 1500.82(a) (2017). 
 141. Id. 
 142. 46 C.F.R. § 199.20 (2017). 
 143. Id. 
 144. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 725.200 (2017) (exempting certain research and devel-
opment activities from reporting requirements); cf. id. § 745.101 (exempting cer-
tain housing transactions from disclosure of potential lead-based paint expo-
sure). 
 145. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions 
to Administrative Rules, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 278 (1982). 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 7194(a) (2017). 
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waivers,147 no-action letters,148 or variances149 that carve out ex-
ceptions to regulatory requirements on a case-by-case basis. 
Regulation counts take no account of this. While the exist-
ence of exceptions may, admittedly, add complexity to regulatory 
regimes, this type of complexity ultimately alleviates costs/bur-
dens/constraints on regulated entities, and thus cannot merely 
be added to a tally that purports to measure any of these con-
structs. 
b. Alternatives 
Some regulations contain multiple alternative means of 
complying with primary statutory or regulatory requirements. 
For instance, in the quoted regulation FERC gives covered facil-
ities options as to how they will deliver and price energy: 
Each qualifying facility shall have the option either: (1) To provide en-
ergy as the qualifying facility determines such energy to be available 
for such purchases, in which case the rates for such purchases shall be 
based on the purchasing utility’s avoided costs calculated at the time 
of delivery; or (2) To provide energy or capacity pursuant to a legally 
enforceable obligation for the delivery of energy or capacity over a spec-
ified term, in which case the rates for such purchases shall, at the op-
tion of the qualifying facility exercised prior to the beginning of the 
specified term, be based on either: (i) The avoided costs calculated at 
the time of delivery; or (ii) The avoided costs calculated at the time the 
obligation is incurred.150 
While covered facilities need only select one of the options pre-
sented in this regulation, and thus will be subject to only one 
mandate, the text of the regulation contains three mandatory 
search terms. 
Similarly, regulations sometimes give regulated entities the 
option to consolidate regulatory requirements. For instance, 43 
C.F.R. § 3430.3-2 allows those holding preferential leases for 
 
 147. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (2017) (“The [Federal Communications] 
Commission may, in its discretion and for good cause shown, modify any re-
quirement made by or under the authority of this section either in particular 
instances or by general order applicable to special circumstances or condi-
tions . . . .”). 
 148. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 200.81 (2017) (setting forth procedures for obtain-
ing a no-action letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 149. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 665 (2017) (authorizing the Secretary of Labor to 
grant exceptions to occupational safety and health regulations as follows: “The 
Secretary, on the record, after notice and opportunity for a hearing may provide 
such reasonable limitations and may make such rules and regulations allowing 
reasonable variations, tolerances, and exemptions to and from any or all provi-
sions of this chapter as he may find necessary and proper to avoid serious im-
pairment of the national defense”). 
 150. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(d) (2017) (emphasis added). 
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coal prospecting on BLM lands to satisfy two environmental im-
pact assessment requirements with a single analysis: 
(a) After the applicant has completed the initial showing required un-
der § 3430.2 of this title, the authorized officer shall conduct an envi-
ronmental analysis of the proposed preference right lease area and pre-
pare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement 
on the application. (b) The environmental analysis may be conducted 
in conjunction with and included as part of the environmental impact 
statement required for coal activity planning under § 3420.3-4 of this 
title.151 
This regulation is meant to convey that two regulatory require-
ments can be satisfied by one action. However, it employs three 
string terms to communicate that flexibility. 
Alternatives like these are meant to provide regulated enti-
ties with choice and flexibility. Regulated entities need only com-
ply with one, not all, of the alternatives. The more alternatives 
there are, the less onerous the regulation typically is, but a count 
of regulatory mandates indicates precisely the opposite. 
c. Reference to Other Regulations 
Many regulations containing restrictive language do not 
contain any new restrictions, but merely reference other regula-
tions. For instance, regulations governing recordkeeping by rail-
roads provide: 
(a) For purposes of compliance with the recordkeeping requirements of 
this part, except for the daily inspection record maintained on the loco-
motive required by § 229.21, the cab copy of Form FRA F 6180-49-A 
required by § 229.23, the fragmented air brake maintenance record re-
quired by § 229.27, and records required under § 229.9, a railroad may 
create, maintain, and transfer any of the records required by this part 
through electronic transmission, storage, and retrieval provided that 
all of the requirements contained in this section are met.152 
Although the word “required” is used five times in this provision, 
it does not contain five distinct requirements. Rather, it contains 
one new requirement and merely references requirements con-
tained in four other sections (presumably already counted there). 
The provision includes these references to weave together mul-
tiple, related code provisions so that regulated entities have a 
coherent roadmap to the regulatory scheme. But for purposes of 
the regulation count, the provision is charged with five mandates 
rather than one.153 
 
 151. 43 C.F.R. § 3430.3-2 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 152. 49 C.F.R. § 229.20 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 153. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
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d. Clarification of Legal Requirements 
Many regulations are promulgated to explain with greater 
specificity the meaning of broad, vague legal requirements found 
in statutes or in other regulations. Such elucidation of legal re-
quirements is meant to provide clarity and certainty in applica-
tion of the law so that regulated entities understand whether the 
law applies to them and what they must do to comply.154 Nota-
bly, agencies typically are not under any obligation to promul-
gate clarifying regulations. Agencies with delegated enforcement 
power are at liberty to enforce statutory law against regulated 
entities without any guidance or elaboration whatsoever.155 The 
promulgation of clarifying regulations is premised on the intui-
tion that regulated citizens are better off when they know how 
the agency interprets and plans to apply the law “than if they 
are remitted to the discretion of local agents and to ‘secret 
law.’”156 Indeed, regulated entities often request agencies to is-
sue clarifying regulations or other guidance.157 In a survey of 
regulated entities and their attorneys, one respondent noted: 
“It’s not the number of regulations that is the problem; it’s the 
inability to understand how they apply to a specific situation 
that is the problem. In that analysis, more regulations—and 
 
 154. Regulation counters admit that clarity is valuable. Clyde Wayne Crews, 
the perennial author of Ten Thousand Commandments, stated in a memo to the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee that unclear regulations 
prevent businesses from planning. Regulatory Reform Task Force Check-In: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health Care, Benefits, & Admin. Rules & Sub-
comm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 115th 
Cong. (2017) (statement of Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Vice President for Policy, 
Competitive Enterprise Institute) (Oct. 27, 2017), https://oversight.house.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Wayne-Crews-Regulatory-Reform-Task-Force 
-Testimony-10242017.pdf. 
 155. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292 (1974); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947) (holding that the SEC had a duty to 
enforce standards governing management trading during a reorganization “re-
gardless of whether those standards previously had been spelled out in a gen-
eral rule or regulation”). 
 156. Strauss, supra note 5, at 808. 
 157. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 785; Strauss, supra note 5, at 805 
(describing how license applicants routinely asked the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission to clarify which technical designs would satisfy the performance stand-
ards in the regulations); cf. Seth D. Rothman & Jessica Studness, FDA Faces 
Uncertainty Implementing 21st Century Cures Act, LAW360 (Mar. 15, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/900882/fda-faces-uncertainty-implementing 
-21st-century-cures-act (describing how the FDA regularly issues guidance to 
clarify its regulations). 
  
128 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:93 
 
more specific examples of how they apply—actually might be a 
good thing.”158 
For instance, agencies often issue regulations clarifying 
their interpretation of vague statutory terms. A prominent ex-
ample is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Army Corps) and 
the EPA’s “Waters of the U.S. Rule” (WOTUS rule).159 The Clean 
Water Act (CWA), by its terms, protects “navigable waters,” 
which the statute defines as “the waters of the United States, 
including the territorial seas.”160 Waters that fall within this 
statutory definition are protected by extensive statutory require-
ments, including standards, discharge limitations, permitting, 
and enforcement.161 Waters that fall outside this statutory defi-
nition are not protected by these statutory requirements. Under-
standing the precise coverage of the statutory term “waters of 
the United States” is critical to knowing which activities will be 
covered by CWA requirements and which will not, and thus, to 
providing certainty in planning for those with potentially cov-
ered projects. Unfortunately, the statutory terms selected by 
Congress are notoriously ambiguous.162 Consequently, the Army 
Corps and EPA have endeavored through rulemaking to clarify 
the definition of the statutory terms.163 
While there is ongoing controversy about the proper scope of 
the WOTUS Rule,164 since 1992, all current, former, and pro-
posed versions of the rule have excluded “prior converted 
 
 158. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 783 n.85. In a 2014 case study of New 
Brunswick and Maine landowners, findings suggested that property owners 
from both locales were “comfortable with most regulations and many agreed 
that a combination of incentives and regulations are in fact useful.” Michael R. 
Quartuch & Thomas M. Beckley, Carrots and Sticks: New Brunswick and Maine 
Forest Landowner Perceptions Toward Incentives and Regulations, 53 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 202, 202 (2014). 
 159. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2017). 
 160. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2017). 
 161. See 33 U.S.C. ch. 26. 
 162. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality opin-
ion) (defining “navigable waters” differently from Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in the same case, setting up a circuit split over the proper definition of 
the term). 
 163. Cf. Supplemental Notice: Definition of “Waters of the United States” - 
Recodification of Preexisting Rule, EPA.GOV, https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/ 
supplemental-notice-definition-waters-united-states-recodification-preexisting 
-rule (last updated July 12, 2018) (seeking comments on a proposed rulemaking 
to repeal the current WOTUS definition while agencies continue to work on a 
new definition). 
 164. In a 2014 proposed rule issued by the U.S. EPA, over one million com-
ments were received. Dorothy Noble, WOTUS Backstory: Waters of the United 
States Debate Continues, FARMING MAG. (Feb. 5, 2015), https://web.archive.org/ 
  
2018] THE TROUBLE WITH COUNTING 129 
 
cropland”165 from CWA coverage.166 Prior converted croplands 
are wetlands altered prior to 1985 to make crop production pos-
sible.167 The scope of the exception is defined in mandatory 
terms, including the criteria by which prior converted croplands 
“shall be identified.”168 These regulations articulate a deregula-
tory interpretation of the CWA that is tremendously important 
to the agricultural industry. The administering agencies are un-
der no obligation to interpret the statute in this way or to provide 
codified guidance of this interpretation. 
The agencies could simply proceed with CWA enforcement 
actions against those farmers they believe fall under some un-
stated, possibly dynamic, definition of “waters of the United 
States” and support application of the statute on a case-by-case 
basis in adjudications or court proceedings.169 Enforcement tar-
gets might or might not include those farming converted wet-
lands, as they are not explicitly excluded from CWA coverage by 
statute.170 It is difficult to see how this clarifying regulation—
 
web/20150905080533/https://www.farmingmagazine.com/voices/wotus 
-backstory-waters-of-the-united-states-debate-continues. At one point, the 
EPA’s website allegedly included an “extensive list of organizations and indi-
viduals that have requested clarification of ‘Waters of the U.S.’” via rulemaking. 
Id. During the beginning of his presidency, President Trump issued EO 13,778, 
which orders the EPA to review, and rescind or revise the WOTUS rule, and all 
executive departments and agencies to review, and rescind or revise all “orders, 
rules, regulations, guidelines, or policies implementing or enforcing the final 
rule.” Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497, 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017). The 
Order further explains that a new proposed rule “shall consider” interpreting 
the term consistent with Justice Scalia’s opinion in Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715. Id. 
The Order claims that such changes will “[r]estor[e] the [r]ule of [l]aw, [f ]eder-
alism, and [e]conomic [g]rowth.” Id. 
 165. See Current Implementation of “Waters of the United States”, EPA.GOV, 
https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/about-waters-united-states (last updated Sept. 
18, 2018) (stating pointblank that “‘Waters of the United States’ do not include 
prior converted cropland”). Compare 7 C.F.R. § 12.33 (2011) (exempting from 
regulation the production of agricultural commodities on land deemed to be 
prior converted cropland), with 7 C.F.R. § 12.33 (2017) (same). 
 166. Kristine A. Tidgren, Prior Converted Cropland: A 2015 Review, IOWA 
ST. U. CTR. FOR AGRIC. L. & TAX’N (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.calt.iastate.edu/ 
article/prior-converted-cropland-2015-review; see also Current Implementation 
of “Waters of the United States,” supra note 165.  
 167. 7 C.F.R. § 12.2. 
 168. Id. § 12.32(a) (emphasis added). 
 169. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (addressing argu-
ments made in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)); Chenery, 332 U.S. 
at 203 (holding agencies may decide statutory standards and issues on a case-
by-case basis). 
 170. Michelle R. McKown, A Wetland by Any Other Name: Where Does Fed-
eral Jurisdiction Apply?, GPSOLO, May/June 2016, at 48, 52. 
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that notifies large numbers of regulated entities whether (or not) 
the administering agencies consider their activities to be subject 
to CWA requirements171—imposes costs, burdens, or constraints 
on them. Nonetheless, in calculating the costs, burdens, and con-
straints on regulated entities, regulation counters count com-
mands clarifying existing legal requirements the same as com-
mands imposing new requirements. 
5. Counting Does Not Account for Basic Grammar and 
Punctuation 
a. Counting Does Not Account for the Negation of Mandates 
RegData’s mandate counts are tallied without attention to 
the most basic grammatical context in which the search terms 
are embedded. Many mandatory terms in the C.F.R. are explic-
itly negated by words like no or not. For instance, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 232.2, which governs the environmental impacts of pilings 
placed in the waters of the United States, provides: “(2)(i) Place-
ment of pilings in waters of the United States that does not have 
or would not have the effect of a discharge of fill material shall 
not require a Section 404 permit.”172 Regulation counters count 
the shall without respect to the not that exempts certain pilings 
from the Section 404 permitting process.173 Not only is 40 C.F.R. 
§ 232.2 not a burden on those placing pilings, but, in fact, it re-
lieves them of the burdens imposed by another regulation.174 
Similarly, 18 C.F.R. § 292.309 relieves electric utilities of certain 
obligations after a specified date, stating that if certain condi-
tions are met, they “shall not be required, under this part, to en-
ter into a new contract or obligation to purchase electric energy 
from a qualifying cogeneration facility or a qualifying small 
power production facility.”175 Instead of construing this regula-
tion properly as a relief of regulatory burden, RegData counts it 
as a double-burden, because it contains two mandatory search 
terms.176 
b. Counting Does Not Account for Punctuation 
Some portions of the C.F.R. are phrased in “Question & An-
swer” format to make regulatory requirements more accessible 
 
 171. See 40 C.F.R. § 230 (2017). 
 172. Id. § 232.2 (emphasis added). 
 173. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
 174. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2. 
 175. 18 C.F.R. § 292.309(a) (2017) (emphasis added). 
 176. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
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to lay readers. As a result, the text of the C.F.R. is littered with 
questions, many of which include mandatory language.177 At the 
very least, counting mandatory terms in both questions and an-
swers double-counts the number of mandates. Worse, however, 
it ignores the substance of the answer. For instance, 41 C.F.R. 
§ 302–2.17 asks: “Must I sign a service agreement for a ‘last 
move home’ relocation?”178 It turns out that the answer is: “No, 
you do not need to sign a service agreement for a ‘last move home’ 
relocation.”179 Similarly, 41 C.F.R. § 302–12.9 inquires: “If my 
agency authorizes me to enter a homesale program, must I ac-
cept a buyout offer from the relocation services company?”180 
Again, the answer is: “No, if your agency authorizes you to enter 
a homesale program, your agency must give you the option to 
accept or reject an offer from the relocation services company.”181 
RegData counts mandatory language embedded in questions 
without bothering to learn the answers. 
6. Counting Counts Conditional Benefits as Burdens 
Many regulations set forth criteria and procedures for ob-
taining valuable benefits from the federal government, including 
grants, loans, leases, and entitlements.182 When the federal gov-
ernment elects to provide scarce resources to citizens, it allocates 
them among applicants conditioned upon mandatory, rule-based 
criteria. These rules need not be followed by citizens who do not 
seek the government benefit. Those who elect to follow the rules 
so that they may receive the benefit cannot properly be charac-
terized as burdened or constrained by their choice.183 
Mandatory conditions are attached to government funding 
in the form of loans and grants. For instance, electric utilities 
wishing to obtain loans from the Rural Utilities Service “shall” 
meet conditions relating to the construction of transmission 
 
 177. See infra notes 178–81. 
 178. 41 C.F.R. § 302-2.17 (2018) (emphasis added). 
 179. Id. (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. § 302-12.9 (emphasis added). 
 181. Id. (emphasis added). 
 182. See, e.g., infra notes 184–86. 
 183. This assertion should not be taken as an endorsement of the “bitter with 
the sweet” doctrine. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153–54 (1974) (plu-
rality opinion). Rather, it is an empirical claim that regulations of the type de-
scribed in this paragraph are not properly characterized as costs, burdens, or 
constraints on regulated entities. 
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lines.184 All others may ignore these commands. Similarly, re-
searchers who wish to apply for a federal grant to study the pro-
tection and conservation of marine mammals “shall” comply with 
numerous requirements.185 Those who do not study marine 
mammals, or who do so without federal funding, need not. 
The government also attaches mandatory conditions to the 
grant of federal land use rights. The Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management (BOEM), for instance, grants mineral leases for oil 
and gas exploration and development in federal waters off the 
coast of the United States based on authority delegated by the 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act.186 These lease rights 
are extraordinarily valuable, accounting for seven percent of 
U.S. natural gas production and twenty-four percent of U.S. oil 
production.187 To obtain OCS lease rights, an applicant must 
meet multiple mandatory conditions and follow multiple manda-
tory procedures.188 However, not one of these requirements ap-
plies to anyone who is not seeking to obtain a lucrative OCS lease 
from the federal government. Related regulations provide OCS 
lease applicants the additional benefit of appealing adverse de-
cisions by state agencies denying them permits for offshore oil 
and gas development.189 Prospective OCS licensees must satisfy 
numerous requirements to have their appeals heard by the Inte-
rior Board of Land Appeals.190 However, the appeals procedures 
provide applicants a valuable avenue for getting their oil and gas 
projects federally approved despite state opposition. These ap-
peals-related requirements can hardly be characterized as costs, 
burdens, or constraints on regulated entities. 
The federal organic labeling program similarly provides lu-
crative business opportunities for participants. In 2015, U.S. or-
ganic sales reached a record-high $43.3 billion.191 This sales total 
represented growth of “a robust 11 percent from the previous 
 
 184. 7 C.F.R. § 1726.77 (2017). 
 185. 50 C.F.R. § 82.8 (2017). 
 186. 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.101, 550.200–.204 (2017). 
 187. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., OIL AND GAS LEASING ON THE 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF, https://www.boem.gov/uploadedfiles/boem/oil_ 
and_gas_energy_program/leasing/5boemre_leasing101.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 
2018). 
 188. See 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.200–.262. 
 189. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.120–.131 (2017). 
 190. 30 C.F.R. § 550.235. 
 191. Maggie McNeil, U.S. Organic Sales Post New Record of $43.3 Billion in 
2015, ORGANIC TRADE ASS’N (May 19, 2016), https://www.ota.com/news/press 
-releases/19031. 
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year’s record level and far outstripping the overall food market’s 
growth rate of 3 percent.”192 Those wishing to access the organic 
market must comply with extensive regulatory requirements 
and prohibitions.193 Those who do not, need not. Neither group 
of businesses can properly be said to be burdened or constrained. 
The foregoing examples focus on regulations that distribute 
government benefits to businesses based on mandatory criteria, 
because they most starkly demonstrate the distortions created 
by counting such regulations as costs, burdens, or constraints on 
regulated businesses. It bears notice that large portions of the 
C.F.R. set forth mandatory criteria for individuals to obtain gov-
ernment benefits like Social Security Disability Insurance,194 
Medicaid,195 Veterans’ benefits,196 or welfare assistance197—
many of them quite onerous. The regulations implementing the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, for instance, 
mandate that “[a] parent or caretaker receiving assistance must 
engage in work activities when the State has determined that 
the individual is ready to engage in work or when he or she has 
received assistance for a total of 24 months.”198 Such regulatory 
mandates do, indeed, “limit choice sets,”199 in the preferred par-
lance of regulation counters, but it is difficult to see how they do 
so in ways that contribute to costs, burdens, or constraints on 
regulated entities or how these individual burdens might be 
causally related to macroeconomic outcomes. 
In each of the above contexts, and many more, a business 
that wishes to obtain valuable benefits that the government has 
voluntarily elected to provide must adhere to certain require-
ments. All others are completely free to forego the benefit and 
ignore the requirements. Regulation counts ignore the fact that 
many regulatory commands are means of providing funding and 
market opportunities to regulated businesses rather than impos-
ing costs, burdens, or constraints on them. 
 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. E.g., 7 C.F.R. § 205.236 (2017). 
 194. See 20 C.F.R. ch. III (2017). 
 195. See 42 C.F.R. ch. IV (2017). 
 196. See 38 C.F.R. ch. I (2017). 
 197. 24 C.F.R. § 5.609 (2017). 
 198. 45 C.F.R. § 261.10(a)(1) (2017). 
 199. RegData, supra note 4, at 112. 
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7. Counting Does Not Account for the Benefits of Regulation 
to Regulated Entities 
Much has been made of the failure of counting to account for 
the benefits of regulation to society,200 and certainly this is prob-
lematic from the perspective of economic theory. However, even 
if one were to accept the dubious premise that there is some the-
oretically coherent reason to count only costs to regulated enti-
ties, it is not clear why one would not net-out from those costs 
the measurable benefits that regulated entities themselves re-
ceive from regulation. There is empirical evidence from certain 
contexts that regulated entities benefit from robust regulation. 
For instance, a rigorous experimental study shows that work-
place health and safety inspections conducted by a state agency 
not only reduced worker injuries, but also reduced the direct and 
indirect costs of these injuries to employers, including workers’ 
compensation expenditures and lost workdays, with no detecta-
ble job loss.201 Studies of securities regulation have revealed that 
“higher enforcement intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower 
cost of capital and higher securities valuations”202 than countries 
where enforcement is more lax, collectively benefiting U.S.-listed 
companies, particularly smaller firms.203 
These studies suggest that regulated entities may accrue 
measurable financial benefits, both individually and collectively, 
from being regulated.204 In these cases, the costs of regulation 
might be viewed as a kind of investment that pays returns di-
rectly to the investor. Admittedly, this raises questions about 
 
 200. See, e.g., Cecot & Livermore, supra note 3, at 3 (“We conclude that the 
Order is not calibrated to maximize social welfare because it narrowly focuses 
on the costs of regulation to regulated entities and fails to acknowledge the ben-
efits of regulation.”); Capping Regulation, supra note 3, at 5 (suggesting that it 
would be irrational not to consider net benefits to “distinguish a good rule from 
a bad rule”); Lubbers, supra note 43, at 8 (asserting that the “overall main short-
coming” of EO 13,771 is “that it does not account for the benefit of regulations 
at all”); Freeman, supra note 43 (arguing that EO 13,771 would “strangle even 
the most beneficial rules under the guise of cutting red tape”). 
 201. See generally David I. Levine, Michael W. Toffel & Matthew S. Johnson, 
Randomized Government Safety Inspections Reduce Worker Injuries with No De-
tectable Job Loss, 336 SCI. 907 (2012). 
 202. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007). 
 203. See generally Douglas Cumming, April Knill & Nela Richardson, Firm 
Size and the Impact of Securities Regulation, 43 J. COMP. ECON. 417 (2015) (dis-
cussing effects of public and private enforcement relative to firm size). 
 204. See Coffee Jr., supra note 202; Cumming et al., supra note 203; Levine 
et al., supra note 201. 
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whether regulated entities receive a good return on their invest-
ments. But these are very different questions than regulation 
counters purport to ask and answer. Their tallies omit regula-
tory returns entirely and thus distort the magnitude and nature 
of the costs, burdens, and constraints of regulation on regulated 
entities. 
8. Counting Does Not Account for Enforcement Levels 
It has long been recognized that “it is legal rules and their 
enforcement that together shape the incentives”205—i.e. costs—
that regulated entities face. Regulations are enforced with 
widely varying degrees of stringency and frequency: some are 
enforced vigorously and regularly, others are enforced with mod-
erate stringency or only sporadically, and many are not enforced 
at all.206 At the far end of this continuum are regulations like the 
detailed licensing requirements found in “Public Health and En-
vironmental Radiation Protection Standards for Yucca Moun-
tain, Nevada,”207 which have laid dormant since this designated 
nuclear waste disposal site was shut down in 2010.208 
Even in the normal course, administrative agencies have se-
vere resource constraints that make it impossible to vigorously 
enforce all regulations at all times. While environmental, health, 
and safety regulations are often cited as among the most burden-
some, the budget and staffing levels of health and safety agen-
cies substantially inhibit their ability to enforce these require-
ments.209 It has been reported, for instance, that it would take 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s staff of 
around 2400 inspectors more than ninety years to conduct even 
cursory inspections of all eligible workplaces in the state of 
Texas alone.210 Such extraordinary resource constraints require 
 
 205. Cento G. Veljanovski, The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, in EN-
FORCING REGULATION, 171, 171 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
 206. See, e.g., id. at 172 (describing different forms of regulation enforce-
ment). 
 207. 40 C.F.R. pt. 197 (2017). 
 208. Mike M. Ahlers, Yucca Mountain Project Setup Took Years; Shutdown 
Taking Only Months, CNN (May 10, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/10/ 
yucca.mountain.shutdown/index.html. 
 209. See Bridget M. Hutter & Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Risk, Interest Groups and 
the Definition of Crisis: The Case of Volcanic Ash, 64 BRIT. J. SOC. 383, 399–400 
(2013); Bridget M. Hutter, Variations in Regulatory Enforcement Styles, 11 LAW 
& POL’Y 153, 164–65 (1989). 
 210. Peter Dreier & Donald Cohen, The Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion 
Wasn’t an Accident, HUFFPOST: BLOG (June 4, 2013, 2:34 PM), https://www 
  
136 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:93 
 
agencies to prioritize enforcement in particular areas and depri-
oritize enforcement in other areas.211  
In addition to resource-based prioritization, enforcement 
priorities change with presidential administrations as different 
chief executives with different policy priorities take office.212 It 
has been reported, for instance, that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission sharply curtailed enforcement activities 
against publicly traded companies and their subsidiaries during 
the first six months of SEC Chairman Jay Clayton’s tenure.213 
In the first year of the Trump administration, several agencies 
announced that they would suspend enforcement of certain reg-
ulations.214 
 
.huffingtonpost.com/peter-dreier/texas-fertilizer-plant-explosion_b_3384739 
.html. 
 211. See id. 
 212. For instance, in March 2017, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Admin-
istration announced that it was suspending enforcement of mandated break and 
hours-of-service rules for commercial truck drivers designed to prevent driver 
fatigue and associated accidents. See Nat’l Safety Council, FMCSA Scraps Re-
quirement for Overnight Rest Breaks for CMV Drivers, SAFETY + HEALTH MAG. 
(Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.safetyandhealthmagazine.com/articles/15419 
-fmcsa-scraps-requirement-for-overnight-rest-breaks-for-cmv-drivers; see also 
Hours of Service of Drivers: Notice of Suspension of Enforcement, 79 Fed. Reg. 
76,241 (Dec. 22, 2014) (providing notice of suspension of enforcement in 2014). 
 213. URSKA VELIKONJA, BEHIND THE ANNUAL SEC ENFORCEMENT REPORT: 
2017 AND BEYOND 9 (Nov. 19, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3074073. 
 214. For instance, in August of 2017, Neomi Rao, Administrator of OIRA is-
sued a memo to the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
expressing the review and immediate stay of EEO-1. Memorandum from Neomi 
Rao, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs to Victoria Lipnic, Acting Chair, 
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.reginfo.gov/ 
public/jsp/Utilities/Review_and_Stay_Memo_for_EEOC.pdf. This suspends the 
requirement to report salary data by gender, ethnicity, and race. Id. Rao argues 
that such reporting lacks “practical utility, [is] unnecessarily burdensome, and 
do[es] not adequately address privacy and confidentiality issues.” Id.; see also 
Stephen Miller, White House Suspends Pay-Data Reporting on Revised EEO-1 
Form, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.shrm 
.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/compensation/pages/revised-eeo-1-form 
-suspended.aspx (reporting the stay of the revised provisions of the EEO-1 
form). The EPA attempted to impose a two-year moratorium on the Obama-era 
fugitive emission of methane rule, which restricts methane emissions from oil 
and gas industries. See Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
2017). However, the effort was disrupted when the D.C. Circuit held that the 
delay is “tantamount to amending or revoking a rule” and the CAA does not 
authorize the stay of any of the provisions. Id. at 6; see also Lisa Friedman, 
Court Blocks E.P.A. Effort to Suspend Obama-Era Methane Rule, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/climate/court-blocks-epa 
-effort-to-suspend-obama-era-methane-rule.html (reporting the D.C. Circuit 
Court’s holding in Pruitt). 
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Agencies also sometimes suspend enforcement of regula-
tions while they reconsider them in light of changed circum-
stances or new evidence. For instance, the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration announced that it was suspending en-
forcement of a rule that mandated breaks and hours-of-service 
restrictions for commercial truck drivers after receiving the re-
sults of a study showing that the rule did nothing to prevent 
driver fatigue and associated accidents.215 
The upshot of all this is that, at any given moment in time, 
only a subset of regulations on the books is being actively en-
forced against regulated entities. Regulation counts make no ef-
fort to ascertain which regulatory mandates are lying dormant 
due to non-enforcement, and thus not imposing costs, burdens, 
or constraints on anyone—except, perhaps, the beneficiaries of 
unenforced legal rights216 or society at large.217 Thus, counts that 
include unenforced regulations, as they all do, overstate the cost, 
burden, and constraint of regulation on regulated entities. 
9. Counting Does Not Account for the Source of Regulatory 
Requirements 
Many regulations repeat verbatim (or nearly so) language 
from the statute authorizing them. Agencies draft such regula-
tions for convenience, so that all the key rules in a regulatory 
scheme can be found in one place and to avoid the interpretive 
confusion and inconsistencies that might be created by para-
phrasing rather than reproducing statutory requirements. The 
 
 215. See Notice of Suspension of Enforcement, 79 Fed. Reg. 76,241 (Dec. 22, 
2014); James Jaillet, Current 34-Hour Restart Regs to Stay Put Following Issu-
ance of Long-Awaited FMCSA Report, CCG (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www. 
ccjdigital.com/34-hour-restart-regs-to-stay-put-following-issuance-of-long 
-awaited-fmcsa-report (describing the Department of Transportation study 
prompting the removal of the rules). 
 216. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, The Costs of Unenforced 
Laws: A Field Experiment (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper 
No. 557, 2016) (finding that individuals granted a right to be free from second-
hand smoke suffer a psychological cost when these rights are unenforced even 
when they are indifferent to the material consequences of second-hand smoke). 
 217. See, e.g., Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of In-
sider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75 (2002) (finding that non-enforcement of insider trad-
ing laws results in higher costs of capital in developing countries); Raymond 
Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evi-
dence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007) (finding 
a correlation between unenforced parking laws and corruption norms); Ryan 
Goodman, Beyond the Enforcement Principle: Sodomy Laws, Social Norms, and 
Social Panoptics, 89 CAL. L. REV. 643 (2001) (reporting that unenforced sodomy 
laws in South Africa created a climate of suspicion and surveillance). 
  
138 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:93 
 
U.S. Supreme Court has termed this practice “parroting” and de-
nies agencies the heightened Auer deference they are usually ac-
corded for interpretations of their own regulations when they in-
terpret a regulation that merely parrots statutory language 
enacted by Congress.218 Under such circumstances, the Court 
has said that the question presented is not the meaning of a reg-
ulation that the agency itself has crafted, but rather the meaning 
of the statute.219 
Sometimes the parroted statutory language found in regu-
lations contains mandatory terms. For instance, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a) states that “all assets of an employee benefit plan shall 
be held in trust by one or more trustees.”220 Chapter 29 of the 
C.F.R. Section 2550.403a–1 states, identically, that “all assets of 
an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more 
trustees.”221 To be sure, commands found in parroting regula-
tions like this one may constrain the behavior of regulated enti-
ties. In this sense, they could be said to measure the construct of 
costs, burdens, or constraints. However, the commands con-
tained in these regulations are not agency-created costs, bur-
dens, or constraints on regulated entities. Rather, they are re-
quirements imposed by Congress and the President through 
duly enacted statutes. Agencies are not at liberty to modify or 
eliminate such requirements even if doing so would relieve reg-
ulatory costs, burdens, or constraints on regulated entities. Only 
Congress and the President, acting together under Article I, Sec-
tion 7 of the U.S. Constitution, can amend or repeal a duly en-
acted statutory requirement.222 Thus, counting such require-
ments as costs, burdens, or constraints of administrative 
regulation misperceives the subject imposing them as well as the 
mechanism for alleviating them. 
In light of the foregoing, it is untenable to maintain that the 
number of regulations or regulatory mandates on the books is an 
 
 218. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006). 
 219. Id. 
 220. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2011). 
 221. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.403a–1 (2017). Compare 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a) (2011) 
(discussing the anti-kickback provision of RESPA, which states that “[n]o per-
son shall give and no person shall accept any fee, kickback, or thing of value” 
for referrals of mortgage loan business), with 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(b) (2017) (stat-
ing identically in regulations issued by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) to implement RESPA that “[n]o person shall give and no 
person shall accept any fee, kickback, or other thing of value” for referrals of 
mortgage loan business). 
 222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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accurate measure of the costs, the burdens, or the constraints of 
regulation on regulated entities. If regulation counts do not 
measure these constructs, is it possible that they serve as a proxy 
for something else that has not been explicitly articulated? The 
following Part explores this possibility. 
III.  THE UNQUANTIFIABLE COSTS OF REGULATION   
Although regulation counts do not measure actual costs, 
burdens, or constraints on regulated entities, they might be an 
attempt to capture what I characterize here as the unquantifia-
ble costs of regulation. Unquantifiable costs are different than 
costs that are merely unquantified, meaning that agencies have 
declined to monetize them for one reason or another.223 Unquan-
tifiable costs are costs that defy quantification. This may strike 
some as an oxymoron. In the long-running debate over CBA, 
costs are not typically portrayed as unquantifiable in this sense. 
Costs are the easy part of the calculation.224 By contrast, CBA 
has long been criticized for its inability to account for a litany of 
unquantifiable benefits, from maintaining clear skies to preserv-
ing habitat for polar bears to promoting equity and justice. Ac-
cording to CBA critics, “[t]he basic problem with narrow eco-
nomic analysis of health and environmental protection is that 
human life, health, and nature cannot be described meaningfully 
in monetary terms; they are priceless.”225 
Traditionally, costs have not been portrayed in these terms. 
“[C]osts are typically easier to measure than benefits . . . . Costs 
often take the form of goods that are priced on markets, while 
benefits often do not. In addition, regulated entities themselves 
are often the source for information regarding regulatory costs, 
and they have incentives to produce information about those 
costs.”226 But could it be that some costs are priceless too? Regu-
lation counting may be motivated by the intuition that the true 
costs of regulation, like the true benefits of regulation, are not 
fully accounted for in the ledger of monetized costs that agencies 
 
 223. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the 
Problem of Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 87–91 
(2016). 
 224. Id. at 116 (“[C]osts are typically easier to measure than bene-
fits . . . . Costs often take the form of goods that are priced on markets, while 
benefits often do not. In addition, regulated entities themselves are often the 
source for information regarding regulatory costs, and they have incentives to 
produce information about those costs.”). 
 225. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 17, at 8. 
 226. Masur & Posner, supra note 223, at 116. 
  
140 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:93 
 
regularly include in their cost-benefit analyses. If this is correct, 
what might the unquantifiable costs of regulation be? I leave a 
full elaboration of the answer to those concerned about account-
ing for them. Preliminarily, I suspect that they encompass a set 
of psychic burdens, ranging from the stress business owners ex-
perience in trying to comply with extensive and complex regula-
tory requirements, to the felt experience of some regulated enti-
ties and citizens that regulation impinges on their personal 
freedom and diminishes liberty in society more broadly. Just as 
proponents of regulation developed metrics to measure seem-
ingly unquantifiable benefits of regulation,227 regulation counts 
might be an attempt to capture similarly difficult-to-quantify 
psychic and liberty costs of regulation. 
Indeed, much of the political rhetoric around regulation 
counts links the sheer number of regulations to the psychological 
well-being of business owners and to broader liberty interests. 
Upon signing EO 13,771, President Trump remarked sympa-
thetically that it was an attempt to remedy the fact that Ameri-
can businesses “have been treated very badly.”228 In subsequent 
remarks, President Trump lamented: 
Unchecked regulation undermines our freedoms and saps our spirit, 
destroys our companies. . . . We are a nation of explorers and pioneers 
and innovators and inventors, and regulations have been hurting that 
and hurting it badly. . . . So together, let’s cut the red tape. Let’s set 
free our dreams. And, yes, let’s make America great again. And one of 
the ways we are going to do that is by getting rid of a lot of unnecessary 
regulation.229 
Ascertaining no economically justifiable purpose for EO 13,771, 
economist Robert Shiller surmised that it was likely adopted to 
salve the feelings of individuals who “have strong business con-
nections and seem to take regulation as a personal affront, as if 
it stands as a barrier to their self-actualization and personal ful-
fillment.”230 
The proposition that regulation counts might be a proxy for 
these types of unquantifiable regulatory burdens opens interest-
ing new empirical, theoretical, and political terrain. Empirically, 
 
 227. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 17, at 47–48. 
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 229. Transcripts, CNN (Dec. 14, 2017), http://transcripts.cnn.com/ 
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it suggests the contours of a well-defined construct that could be 
used to develop testable hypotheses. For instance, regulation 
counters could theorize psychic burden as the construct meas-
ured by regulation counts and could test empirical relationships 
between the psychic burdens of regulation and macroeconomic 
outcome variables. To test these relationships, researchers 
would have to establish, first, that the number of regulations or 
regulatory mandates does, indeed, meaningfully measure psy-
chic burdens on owners of regulated business and that psychic 
burdens vary with the quantity of regulations. It is not clear that 
regulation counts would be the best measure of psychic burdens 
or that the psychic burdens of regulation vary continuously, in-
creasing incrementally with each new regulation added. 
If such a relationship could be shown, regulation counters 
could theorize mechanisms by which regulation-induced psychic 
burdens influence macroeconomic outcomes like productivity 
and employment. For instance: Do psychically burdened busi-
ness owners forbear from producing or hiring, even if doing so is 
economically irrational from an efficiency standpoint? Do the 
psychic burdens of regulation shape business owners’ percep-
tions of the business climate in ways that make them less pro-
ductive or less likely to hire? Do citizens in general put forth less 
productive effort if they believe their liberty to be unduly con-
strained? Such hypotheses are theoretically supportable given 
what we know about how psychology shapes economic action,231 
and exploring them empirically could produce valuable insights. 
If such hypothesized relationships were to be established by 
empirical evidence, the next set of questions would concern 
whether removing regulations from the books is the most effec-
tive response. It would be necessary to demonstrate, for instance, 
that reducing the number of regulations or regulatory mandates 
would actually reduce the psychic burdens of regulation, and 
that this is a more effective method of alleviating psychic bur-
dens than other mechanisms. If the burdens of regulation are, 
indeed, psychic, then perhaps it would be more effective to shift 
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perceptions of regulatory burdens rather than to change the ac-
tual number of regulations on the books. Such a shift in percep-
tion might be achieved by moderating hysterical political rheto-
ric that incites regulatory passions by endlessly decrying the 
massive quantity of regulation crushing the populace. 
The theoretical and political implications of surfacing the 
psychic burdens of regulation are more radical, for they gesture 
toward the unraveling of the reigning consensus around CBA. 
As discussed above, regulation counting eschews foundational 
principles of welfare economics underlying CBA by ignoring the 
benefits of regulation.232 This deprives CBA of a principled jus-
tification. But more subtly, and perhaps more treacherously, reg-
ulation counting suggests that even the costs of regulation have 
not been captured adequately by CBA. It becomes exceedingly 
difficult to sustain the quantification enterprise if the costs as 
well as the benefits of regulation include significant unquantifi-
able feelings, values, and moral commitments. Understood in 
this way, the widespread embrace of regulation counting sug-
gests the need to develop (or to resurrect) alternative decision-
making structures to CBA that better account for emotional and 
normative considerations.233 Such decision-making structures 
might allow regulators and the public to weigh more openly and 
frankly the values at stake in regulation. For instance, what are 
the relative values of, on the one hand, protecting citizens from 
preventable harms like mine collapses, plant explosions, and 
toxic pollution and, on the other hand, preserving their cher-
ished experience of living in a free society? Ideally, framing ques-
tions in this way would lead to more honest political dialogue 
about regulatory methods, priorities, and trade-offs. 
Setting aside for the moment the empirical, theoretical, and 
political possibilities presented by the psychic burden construct, 
it is important to stress three points. First, to date, none of the 
above empirical claims about the relationship between psychic 
burdens and economic outcomes has been established empiri-
cally—or, for that matter, seriously theorized. Regulation coun-
ters have not explicitly claimed psychic burden as their con-
struct. It is not entirely clear why not. Perhaps it connotes 
weakness or victimhood on the part of business owners in ways 
 
 232. See supra Part II.B. 
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that are politically unpalatable. Perhaps regulatory anxiety is 
too valuable a trigger for political mobilization to acknowledge 
as the cause of the problem. Attempts to alleviate it would blunt 
this political weapon. In any event, the speculative propositions 
suggested in this Section are, for now, just that. 
Second, inflamed regulatory passions, standing alone, do 
not provide a sufficiently rational basis for deregulatory policies 
imposed by the executive. A policy calculated to lift the down-
trodden spirits of the President’s supporters in the business com-
munity surely falls into the realm of political justifications for 
agency action that courts have soundly rejected on judicial re-
view.234 Moreover, it seriously threatens the constitutional bal-
ance of powers among the branches in the administrative state. 
Policies like 2-for-1 are not merely political in the sense that they 
relate to the strategy or ideology of a particular party; they are 
baldly distributional. EO 13,771 is a policy choice to redistribute 
wealth to a select category of individuals favored by the Presi-
dent, whom the President sees as disfavored by certain statutory 
schemes mandating regulation. In many cases, the regulation 
counting (and cutting) required by EO 13,771 would force agen-
cies to redistribute wealth that, according to principles of CBA, 
has been efficiently distributed by already-enacted or proposed 
regulations. 
This is deeply troubling from a separation of powers per-
spective. Distributive choices are at the very heart of the legisla-
tive prerogative.235 Article I, Section I, of the U.S. Constitution 
delegates legislative power exclusively to Congress.236 Although 
a long line of cases permits Congress to delegate the implemen-
tation of federal statutes to the executive branch,237 equally well-
 
 234. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51–56 (1983); see also Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in 
American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 
1811, 1823–28 (2012); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbi-
trary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 83 (2009). 
 235. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 663 
(1980) (Burger, J., concurring). 
 236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 237. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding that the 
Clean Air Act properly delegated legislative power to the Environmental Pro-
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established principles of administrative law seek to ensure the 
rational and non-arbitrary execution of that power by agen-
cies.238 The principle of non-arbitrariness serves not only rule of 
law values, but also separation of powers principles, by making 
sure that agencies do not stray too far from their statutory au-
thority into the realm of presidential patronage. These founda-
tional constitutional principles and values should not be compro-
mised by masking baldly distributive political motivations with 
seemingly innocuous and falsely objective regulation counts. 
Third, if regulation does, indeed, impose unquantifiable psy-
chic burdens, this has strategic implications for proponents of 
regulation as they think about how to combat deregulatory ini-
tiatives. In eschewing the pretense of welfare maximization, the 
regulation counting project suggests that the deregulatory im-
pulse is driven as much by a deep-seated emotional antipathy 
toward regulation as by economic concerns about costs and effi-
ciency.239 If this is the case, then a generation of regulatory re-
form efforts aimed at bolstering support for regulation by 
grounding it in market mechanisms have missed the mark. To 
date, the prevailing strategy of regulation proponents has been 
to embrace the CBA discourse of efficiency maximization and to 
demonstrate the welfare-enhancing properties of regulation.240 
The regulation counting project exposes the limits of this strat-
egy by revealing that the true aim of the deregulatory project is 
not more efficient regulation, but simply less. 
This insight suggests that proponents of regulation must do 
a better job of addressing—or neutralizing—negative feelings 
about regulation if they are to salvage it. In fact, an influential 
strand of the regulatory reform project has included sustained 
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attempts to do just that through programs that cultivate cooper-
ative relationships with regulated entities. These programs 
avoid punitive enforcement practices in favor of dialogue with 
regulated entities about what compliance entails, flexibility in 
the methods required to achieve compliance, and a preference for 
forbearance and compliance assistance over punishment for non-
compliance.241 It appears, however, that such cooperative ap-
proaches to regulation have failed to bolster the feelings of the 
business community towards the regulatory enterprise.242 Just 
as regulation counting represents a new chapter in deregulatory 
policy, it should prompt a wholesale reassessment of progressive 
regulatory reform efforts. 
IV.  WHAT’S THE HARM IN COUNTING?   
These are demanding prescriptions that are not easily real-
ized in the short term. Which begs the question, why not just go 
ahead and count in the meantime? Regulation counters appear 
to enjoy this activity, and while they recognize its empirical 
shortcomings, they broadly maintain that it is better to have 
counts than not to quantify regulation at all.243 I argue in this 
Section that there are three reasons to stop the counting now. 
First, it undermines the achievement of statutory goals. Second, 
it is costly and wasteful. Third, it crowds out meaningful dia-
logue and research about the real and difficult problems of reg-
ulation. 
First, counting for counting’s sake undermines the achieve-
ment of statutory goals. Duly enacted legislation, passed 
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through the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid-
ered”244 procedures set forth in Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the 
U.S. Constitution, has charged agencies with accomplishing spe-
cific tasks for the purpose of achieving specific social and eco-
nomic goals. These statutes are intended to benefit or protect 
many different constituencies, including workers, consumers, in-
vestors, businesses, children, the infirm, the elderly, and the 
public at large. Denying or delaying the enactment of important 
new rules that are statutorily mandated as “necessary to protect 
public health and welfare can have severe, even disastrous, con-
sequences: think of tainted food, toxic spills, unavailable medi-
cines, unsafe trains and planes.”245 Counting thus puts protected 
statutory rights holders at grave risk of harm. 
Second, counting is, itself, costly and wasteful. EO 13,771 
requires agencies to devote substantial new resources to analyze 
the costs of regulations and to propose and support the repeal of 
regulations through notice and comment procedures.246 Support-
ers of the Order have suggested that Congress will have to ap-
propriate funds for agency staff positions dedicated to these 
tasks.247 In other words, this purported cost-cutting effort will be 
extraordinarily costly.248 And it provides little in the way of ben-
efits to offset these costs. 
 
 244. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 245. Freeman, supra note 43. 
 246. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 787 (“Initiating and defending regu-
latory erosion also diverts agency resources and public attention from new ini-
tiatives more likely at any moment to be deemed popular and positive.”). 
 247. BROOKINGS EVALUATION, supra note 29, at 15. 
 248. Notably, it is much less costly to implement 2-for-1 type policies in the 
other countries that have adopted them, because these countries are parliamen-
tary democracies. Administrative agencies play a very different role in parlia-
mentary systems than in presidential systems like that prevailing in the United 
States, and they are governed by very different procedural rules. First, it is eas-
ier to enact regulatory rules legislatively rather than administratively in a par-
liamentary system than in a presidential system because of the identity be-
tween the legislature and the executive. Consequently, there is less delegation 
of rulemaking functions to administrative agencies and greater legislative con-
trol and prerogative in parliamentary systems than in the U.S. administrative 
state. Second, because administrative agencies are not entirely independent of 
the legislature in a parliamentary system, they are not subject to the same 
kinds of procedural safeguards imposed on U.S. agencies by the Administrative 
Procedure Act. In particular, parliamentary systems have no equivalent to no-
tice and comment rulemaking, the time consuming and costly procedure by 
which U.S. agencies must enact and repeal regulations. There are minimal pro-
cedures constraining agencies’ ability to enact or repeal administrative regula-
tions in parliamentary democracies. Thus, removing regulations from the books 
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Finally, counting distracts from serious political dialogue 
and research that could produce a more fair and effective regu-
latory system. Citizens look to government for protection from a 
host of risks arising out of a complex, technologically advanced 
society, from toxic pollution, to consumer fraud, to discrimina-
tion, to terrorism. Reducing political dialogue about these issues 
to the number of regulations on the books crowds out meaningful 
discussion of when and how we should regulate. These conversa-
tions are vital to surface and elaborate collective values about 
what kind of society we want to live in and how we should be 
governed, but it is difficult to hear them above the din of count-
ing. 
Research on regulation has an important role to play in 
shaping these conversations and in helping administrators im-
plement policy arising out of them. The important empirical 
questions about regulation concern not how much of it there is, 
but under what conditions particular types of regulation are 
likely to be more or less effective. There are also important em-
pirical questions about the spillover effects regulation might 
have on various economic outcomes, positive or negative. A 
handful of studies have sought to ascertain rigorously the rela-
tionship between regulation and employment in specific regula-
tory contexts. These studies, taken together, suggest that this 
relationship is complex and contingent:249 some regulations are 
associated with job losses,250 others are associated with job 
 
does not require the same investment and diversion of administrative resources 
in these systems that it does in the United States. 
 249. David M. Driesen, Does Regulation Kill Jobs?: The Limits of Quantifi-
cation, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 193, 193–94 (2015). See generally DOES REGULA-
TION KILL JOBS? (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the various em-
pirical research on the effects of regulation on employment). 
 250. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & William A. Pizer, The Employment and Com-
petitiveness Impacts of Power-Sector Regulations, in DOES REGULATION KILL 
JOBS?, supra note 249, at 70 (finding negative employment effects in the most 
energy intensive sectors); cf. Richard D. Morgenstern et al., Jobs Versus the En-
vironment: An Industry-Level Perspective, 43 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 412 
(2002) (predicting negative employment effects in industries where pollution 
abatement activities are not labor intensive and product demand is elastic). 
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gains,251 others with the shifting of jobs among regions or sec-
tors252 or even within the same plant,253 and still other regula-
tions have no statistically significant association with economic 
outcomes at all.254 In addition, research finds that the relation-
ship between regulation and employment is moderated by non-
regulatory factors, for instance, demand levels and industry con-
centration ratios.255 The bottom line is that no credible blanket 
statement can be made about the aggregate economic effects of 
regulation. Regulation counting distracts and diverts resources 
from serious research on economic and other consequences of 
regulation. Allowing regulation counts to drive policy increases 
the prospect that we will get these critical empirical questions 
wrong in specific instances, resulting in more economic harm 
than good. 
  CONCLUSION   
Drawing on prevailing standards in social science research 
and a detailed analysis of federal regulations, this Article 
 
 251. See, e.g., Morgenstern et al., supra note 250, at 429 (finding positive 
employment effects in industries like petroleum and plastics where environ-
mental compliance is labor intensive and product demand is relatively inelas-
tic). 
 252. See, e.g., Michael Greenstone, The Impacts of Environmental Regula-
tions on Industrial Activity: Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments and the Census of Manufacturers, 110 J. POL. ECON. 1175 (2002) 
(finding that in the first fifteen years of the Clean Air Act, jobs and capital in-
vestment likely shifted back and forth from nonattainment areas to attainment 
areas but that there was no net reduction in aggregate economic activity). 
 253. See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, Analyzing the Employment Impacts 
of Regulation, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS?, supra note 249, at 33, 46 (re-
porting that “there is abundant anecdotal evidence that a large proportion of 
workers ‘displaced’ by environmental regulation move to other jobs in the same 
plant or firm”). 
 254. See, e.g., Aldy & Pizer, supra note 250, at 81 (finding no employment 
impact of environmental regulations for eighty percent of manufacturers); Eli 
Berman & Linda T. M. Bui, Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Ev-
idence from the South Coast Air Basin, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 265, 269 (2001) (finding 
negligible employment impacts of Clean Air Act regulation); Nathan Goldschlag 
& Alex Tabarrok, Is Regulation to Blame for the Decline in American Entrepre-
neurship?, 33 ECON. POL’Y 5 (2018) (finding no statistically significant relation-
ship between RegData’s regulation counts and trends in economic dynamism); 
Morgenstern et al., supra note 250, at 429 (finding little evidence of employment 
consequences of regulation in the steel and pulp and paper industries, where 
labor represents a large share of production costs and demand is relatively elas-
tic). 
 255. Wayne B. Gray & Ronald J. Shadbegian, Do the Job Effects of Regula-
tion Differ with the Competitive Environment?, in DOES REGULATION KILL 
JOBS?, supra note 249, at 51, 59–61. 
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demonstrates that regulation counting is an irrational and em-
pirically unsound method of measuring constructs like regula-
tory costs or burdens and empirically assessing their relation-
ship to economic outcomes. Because regulation counts are not a 
good proxy for mechanisms like cost or burden that are pur-
ported to affect economic outcomes, they have limited ability to 
support causal claims about the relationship between regulation 
and economic outcomes. Two critical implications flow from this. 
First, agencies and courts should not rely on empirical studies 
that employ regulation counts to implement or uphold the legal-
ity of deregulatory counting policies like 2-for-1. Second, alt-
hough the number of regulations on the books is not an accurate 
measure of the costs, the burdens, or the constraints of regula-
tion on regulated entities, it may serve as a proxy for the un-
quantifiable costs of regulation. This possibility opens up new 
ways of thinking about the deregulation and regulatory reform 
projects and suggests the need for a collective dialogue about the 
values served by regulation and the way regulation helps and 
harms different groups of citizens. It is time to stop counting and 
start engaging in meaningful conversations about specific socie-
tal problems and appropriate regulatory responses. 
 
